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The dissertation contains two major research projects. In the rst
project, we rst study a multi-period inventory planning problem. In each
period, the rm under consideration can source from two possibly unreliable
suppliers for a price-dependent demand. Our analysis suggests that the opti-
mal procurement policy is neither a simple reorder-point policy nor a complex
one without any structure, as previous studies suggest. Instead, we prove the
existence of a reorder point for each supplier. No order is placed to that sup-
plier for any inventory level above the reorder point and a positive order is
issued to that supplier for almost every inventory level below the reorder point.
We characterize conditions under which the optimal policy reveals monotone
response to changes in the inventory level. Furthermore, two special cases of
our model are examined in detail to demonstrate how our analysis generalizes
a number of well-known results in the literature.
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In the second project, we study a long-run inventory planning problem
in which the retailer can replenish inventory and change price adjustment. We
establish that it is optimal to change the price from low to high in each replen-
ishment cycle, the optimal order-up-to level may decrease when the ordering
cost increases, and fewer customers are served when the unit cost of procure-
ment increases. Additionally, we provide ecient algorithms to compute the
optimal stocking and pricing policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We move to an age which is full of uncertainties and changes. Retailers
have to adjust their sales policies based on inventory levels, demand uncertain-
ties, competitors' strategies etc. On the other hand, customers' choices not
only depend on prices of retailers but also rely on their trust on the retailers.
This dissertation tries to answer a few issues in such complicated context.
In the rst project, we study a multi-period inventory planning prob-
lem. Multi-souring can hedge against risk of supply unreliability. However, it
is unclear what procurement policy the rm should follow when the demand of
the product is also price-dependent. We formulate a multi-period procurement
problem and developed a new procurement policy, named \near re-order point
policy". It is neither a simple reorder-point policy nor a complex one without
any structure, as previous studies suggest. Instead, we prove the existence of
a reorder point for each supplier. No order is placed to that supplier for any
inventory level above the reorder point and a positive order is issued to that
supplier for almost every inventory level below the reorder point. We charac-
terize conditions under which the optimal policy reveals monotone response
to changes in the inventory level. Furthermore, two special cases of our model
1
are examined in detail to demonstrate how our analysis generalizes a number
of well-known results in the literature.
In the second project we study a long-run inventory planning problem
in which the retailer can replenish inventory and change price dynamically.
The study answers the following three questions: 1) How frequently should a
retailers change prices? 2) When to change prices if the retail can only adjust
price limited times? 3) How to change prices? Our analysis discovers that the
frequency of price change is related to the adjustment cost. In the extreme
case, the retailer will change price every time the inventory level changes. The
retailer prefers to change price less frequently if the adjustment cost is higher.
We also investigate the pattern of the optimal sales strategy. We show that it
is optimal to change the price from low to high in each replenishment cycle,
the optimal order-up-to level may decrease when the ordering cost increases,
and fewer customers are served when the unit cost of procurement increases.
2
Chapter 2
Sourcing from Suppliers with Random Yield
for Price-Dependent Demand
2.1 Introduction
1 Supply as well as demand uncertainties are commonly present in prac-
tice. They impose dierent types of challenges in procurement planning. For
example, rms have realized the importance of mitigating supply risk via mul-
tiple sourcing whereas chosen to shape demand via dynamic pricing to miti-
gate the risk of under- or over-stocking. In this study, we combine these two
approaches into a problem of jointly pricing and multiple sourcing in a multi-
period, single-product revenue maximization setting. We study the problem of
an inventory manager who can replenish from two sources with random yields
and price the product based on the stock level in each period over a nite
planning horizon.
We show that the optimal procurement policy is neither a simple reorder-
point policy nor a complex one without any structure. Instead, we prove the
existence of a reorder point for each supplier. No order is placed to that sup-
plier for any inventory level above the reorder point and a positive order is
1The project is a joint work with Professor Feng Qi and Professor Sridhar Seshadri.
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issued to that supplier for almost every inventory level below the reorder point.
We label such a policy as a \near reorder-point policy" because the optimal
order quantity may equal zero at countable points below the reorder level. We
also characterize conditions under which the optimal policy reveals monotone
response to changes in the inventory level.
Two important special cases of this problem have been widely discussed
in the literature. The rst is the problem of supply diversication under ex-
ogenous price. This line of work was initiated by Anupindi and Akella [5]
with further development by Dada et al. [27], Burke et al. [14], Federgruen
and Yang [31], Federgruen and Yang [30], among others. For multi-period
problems, it is known that under the assumption of a continuous demand dis-
tribution, the optimal policy is a reorder-point policy for each supplier. That
is, a strictly positive order is placed when the inventory level is less than the
reorder point for that supplier. In contrast, we establish that for discrete
demand distribution the policy is in general a near reorder-point policy.
The second special case of our problem is when only a single unreliable
supplier is involved and the demand is price dependent. For this model, Li and
Zheng [48] prove that the optimal order quantity and price are nonincreasing
in the inventory level when the demand has only an additive noise component.
They also conjecture that the optimal policy is complex when a multiplicative
demand noise is introduced. In this case, they suggest that there can be
several strictly positive alternating ordering and no-ordering intervals of the
inventory level. In contrast, we show that such positive no-ordering intervals
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cannot exist because the policy is a near reorder-point policy.
We consider two suppliers but our results extend to n suppliers. We
allow for both additive and multiplicative demand uncertainty. We also discuss
how the sequence of knowing the uncertainty and making the decisions impacts
the policy behavior. Specically, there are thirty-two potential cases. The
manager can know the price uncertainty before or after the price decision and
he also can know uncertainty regarding yields from suppliers before or after
placing the order. There can be multiple suppliers or just a single supplier.
The demand uncertainty can be additive or multiplicative. The distribution
of the demand can be continuous or discrete. We provide results for all these
cases.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In x2.2, we lay
out the model and derive our main result|the optimality of a near reorder-
point policy. In x2.3, we revisit two important special cases of our model to
demonstrate that our policy characterization is exact. We also derive con-
ditions under which the optimal price and order quantity decisions become
monotone with respect to the inventory level, which allows us to generalize
a number of previous results. In x2.4, we examine the case when either the
supply yields are perfectly correlated or the supply and demand are perfectly
correlated. Section 2.5 concludes the study.
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2.2 Problem Formulation and the Near Reorder-point
Policy
This section presents the general model. The problem is formulated in
x2.2.1 and the main result is derived in x2.2.2.
2.2.1 Model Development
The manager faces a T -period planning problem. To simplify the no-
tation, we consider a system with stationary parameters over time. At the
beginning of period t, the (net) inventory level It is reviewed. The manager
needs to replenish inventory for fullling an uncertain demand D(pt), where
pt is the unit selling price that has to be determined. There are two potential
suppliers, indexed by i = 1; 2, whose output yields may be uncertain. Speci-
cally, if an order of qt;i is placed, the actual amount delivered from supplier i
is uiqt;i, where ui 2 [0; 1] is the random yield rate with Eui = ui > 0. Both the
price pt and orders (qt;1; qt;2) must be determined before demand and supply
uncertainties are resolved. The unmet demand is backordered and the leftover
inventory is carried over to the next period.
The manager pays ci dollars for each unit delivered from supplier i.
In other words, he pays an average of ci = uici for each unit ordered from
supplier i. Without loss of generality, we assume c1  c2. The manager also
pays a surplus/shortage cost H() upon the demand realization. We assume
that H()  0 is continuous and convex. Also, H(0) = 0, jH(x1)  H(x2)j 
cH jx1   x2j for some positive and nite cH , and limx!1H(x) =1.
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The customer pays the current price pt upon the realization of demand
in period t. This price may not be the same as the price quoted at the time
when he actually obtains the product if the demand is backordered. In other
words, the delay in lling the order does not aect the price charged directly.
Instead, the manager pays a penalty cost for the backorder via H(), which
includes the loss of goodwill or compensation to the customer. Such a pricing
scheme is widely used in examining joint pricing and replenishment decisions.
The demand in period t is given by
D(pt) = "D(pt) + !; pt 2 [p; p]; (2.1)
where " and ! are, respective, the multiplicative and additive demand noise
terms. We assume that ! has mean zero and support [!; !], and " has mean
one and support ["; "]. Moreover, ! and " are independent. For any feasible
choice of pt 2 [p; p], the demand is nonnegative with probability one and the
average demand D(pt) is nite. The average demand D(pt)  0, pt 2 [p; p], has
an inverse p(d) that is decreasing over [d; d], where d = D(p) and d = D(p).
2 Thus, choosing an average demand d is equivalent to charging a price p(d).
We shall assume that p = p(d) > c1 so that it is protable to procure and
sell the product for some feasible selling price. We also require the revenue
R(d) = dp(d) to be nite and concave for d 2 [d; d]. The pricing scheme and the
demand model stated above have been commonly assumed in the literature
(see, e.g., [48],[22], [18]). We do not restrict the demand D(pt) to follow a
2Increasing and decreasing are in the weak sense unless otherwise specied.
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continuous distribution. In reality, discreteness of demand distribution may
arise due to several reasons, such as sales restrictions (e.g., bulky quantities
required by wholesalers).
Now we can write the inventory dynamics for our problem as follows
[15]:
It+1 = It + u1q1 + u2q2   "d  !: (2.2)
Let Vt(I) be the optimal prot function in period t when the inventory level
is I. We assume that VT+1(I) = 0 for all I. Then, the optimality equation is
given by
[G] Vt(I) = max
q10;q20;
ddd
Jt(I; q1; q2; d); (2.3)
where
Jt(I; q1; q2; d) = R(d)  c1q1   c2q2 + ELt(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d); (2.4)
Lt(y) =  EH(y   !) + EVt+1(y   !); (2.5)
and  2 [0; 1] is the discount factor. We denote qt;i(I), i = 1; 2 and dt (I) to
be, respectively, the optimal order quantities and average demand3 in period
t.
3If multiple optimal solution exists, we always choose the one with the smallest qt;1(I). If
there are multiple optimal solutions containing the smallest qt;1(I), we choose the one with
the smallest qt;2(I) and then the one with the smallest d

t (I). Under such solution selection
criterion, the optimal qt;1(I), q

t;2(I) and d

t (I) are continuous in I; see Lemma A.0.1 in the
appendix.
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For ease of exposition, we have assumed that the random yields and
the demand noise terms each form an independent sequence of independent
and identically distributed random variables. However, all the results derived
carry through when each of the processes are Markov-modulated or when they
are correlated. Moreover, all of our results hold when considering more than
two suppliers.
2.2.2 A Near Reorder-point Policy
In this section, we prove that the optimal ordering policy for the model
developed in the previous section is a near reorder-point policy. Under this
policy, as stated in Theorem 2.2.1 below, there is a threshold It;i for supplier
i, i = 1; 2, in period t. No order is issued to supplier i if the inventory level is
above It;i. If, however, the inventory level is below I

t;i, a positive order is placed
to supplier i almost everywhere|there cannot be a non-degenerate interval
below It;i within which no order is issued. Later in x2.3, we will demonstrate
that the policy characterized in Theorem 2.2.1 is exact. In other words, the
optimal ordering decision is neither a simple threshold policy nor a complex
one involving alternating ordering and no-ordering intervals as previous studies
may suggest [48].
Theorem 2.2.1. (The Near Reorder-Point Policy) There exists a nite
optimal reorder point It;i < +1, i = 1; 2, such that
qt;i(I)

= 0 I 2 [It;i;+1)
S
Xi
> 0 otherwise:
where Xi is a countable set and thus has Lebesgue measure of zero.
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We prove the theorem by establishing Lemmas 2.2.1 through 2.2.6 be-
low, which also allow us to obtain insights into the problem. The idea is to
dene a benchmark problem, model B, and compare its solution with that of
our general model. In particular, the benchmark problem assumes the sup-
plier 1's yield rate in period t is a deterministic value, u1, and the yields in
any future periods stay at u1. Therefore, the only dierence between model B
dened below and model G lies in the calculation immediate prot in period t.
Specically, the objective function for the benchmark problem can be stated
as
[B] V Bt (I) = max
q10;q20;
ddd
JBt (I; q1; q2; d);
JBt (I; q1; q2; d) = R(d)  c1q1   c2q2 + ELt(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d):
Let qBt;1(I) , q
B
t;2(I) and d
B
t (I) denote the optimal decisions of the above prob-
lem. We term this benchmark problem as model B, whereas the general prob-
lem dened in (2.3)-(2.5) as model G.
The rst observation, articulated in the next lemma, is that the cost
functions involved in both problems are well-behaved.
Lemma 2.2.1. The functions Lt, Jt, J
B
t , and Vt are concave. Both J
B
t (I; q1; q2; d)
and Jt(I; q1; q2; d) are submodular in (I; qi) and supermodular in (qi; d) and
(I; d), i = 1; 2.
Lemma 2.2.1 suggests that the cost functions in both models are con-
cave, which is a direct consequence of concavity of one-period costs. The con-
cavity results allow for further exploration of the optimal policy analytically.
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Moreover, the submodularity and supermodularity of the objective functions
suggest that inventory and the order quantities are substitutes, whereas they
are complements of the average demand. Intuitively, these relations may sug-
gest smaller order quantities and a larger average demand when the inventory
level is higher. However, as we show in x2.3, the optimal decisions may not
be monotone with respect to the inventory level even in special cases of our
model.
The next result indicates a simple strategy to order from supplier 1,
who has a deterministic yield, in the benchmark problem B.
Lemma 2.2.2. There exists a yBt;1 such that q
B
t;1(I) = maxf(yBt;1   I)=u1; 0g.
Moreover, there exist qBt;2 and
dBt , such that q
B
t;2(I) = q
B
t;2 and d
B
t (I) =
dBt for
I  yBt;1.
Because the yield rate of supplier 1 is deterministic in problem B, de-
termining the order quantity qBt;1 for a given I is equivalent to determining the
post-order inventory position yBt;1 = I+u1q
B
t;1. Given (I; q
B
t;1), the optimal order
from supplier 2 and the optimal average demand depend on (I; qBt;1) only via
yBt;1. These observations allows us to compute the optimal y
B
t;1 as the base-stock
level for supplier 1, which is independent of the inventory level I. Whenever,
the inventory level I is below the base-stock level yBt;1, an order is issued to
supplier 1 to bring the stock level up to yBt;1. Correspondingly, a xed order
of qBt;2 is placed to supplier 2 and a xed price of p(
dBt ) is charged. When
I > yBt;1, however, no order is issued to supplier 1. In this case, the optimal
11
order quantity from supplier 2 and the optimal average demand depend on
the inventory level in a nonlinear manner in general, as implied from our later
analysis in x2.3.2.
Compared to the benchmark model B, our model G is less likely to
order from supplier 1 as stated in the lemma below.
Lemma 2.2.3. If qBt;1(I) = 0, then q

t;1(I) = 0.
The intuition of Lemma 2.2.3 is as follows. When a positive order
is placed to the supplier with random yield in model G there is a risk in the
associated delivery quantity. This risk makes it even more undesirable to order
in model G given that no order was placed with the supplier in model B.
It is interesting to contrast this result to Theorem 4.4 in [48]. They
prove that qBt;1(I) = 0 implies q

t;1(I) = 0 and q
B
t;1(I) > 0 implies q

t;1(I) > 0 for
the special case of our models with a single supplier (i.e., u2 = 0) and without a
multiplicative demand noise (i.e., " = 1). In other words, the optimal policies
call for either ordering from supplier 1 in both models, or not ordering from
supplier 1 in both. The comparison in Lemma 2.2.3 allows for the possibility
of ordering in model B (i.e., qBt;1(I) > 0), but not in model G (i.e., q

t;1(I) = 0).
Such a possibility, as shown in our subsequent analysis, can indeed happen in
our models.
Our next result further states that whether or not to place a positive
order has a direct implication on the marginal value of the inventory.
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Lemma 2.2.4. Let ~qt;i(I) be the smallest unconstrained maximizer of Jt(I; qt;1; qt;2; dt)
with dt = d

t (I) and qt;j = q

t;j(I), j 6= i.
i) If ~qt;i(I) < 0, then there exists a  > 0 such that
Vt(I) Vt(I )

 ci.
ii) If ~qt;i(I) > 0, then there exists a  > 0 such that
Vt(I+) Vt(I)

 ci.
By denition, we must have qt;i(I) = 0 when ~qt;i(I) < 0 and q

t;i(I) =
~qt;i(I) = 0 when ~qt;i(I) > 0. According to Lemma 2.2.4 ii), the marginal value
of inventory must exceeds the unit ordering of the supplier whenever a positive
order is issued to that supplier. Because the marginal value of inventory is
decreasing (as Vt(I) is concave), this observation indicates a reorder point for
the supplier, which is bounded from the above.
Lemma 2.2.5. There exists an It;i < +1, such that qt;i(I) = 0 for I  It;i.
i = 1; 2.
With Lemmas 2.2.3{2.2.5 in hand, we can derive the following result
which directly leads to Theorem 2.2.1.
Lemma 2.2.6. Suppose that there exists an I such that qt;1(I) = 0 and q

t;1(I+
) > 0 for any  2 [0; +) and some + > 0. Then, there exists a   > 0 such
that qt;1(I   ) > 0 for any  2 (0;  ).
According to Lemma 2.2.6, given that no order should be placed at the
inventory level I and that a positive order is placed at I + , then a positive
order must be placed around the neighborhood of I. In other words, there
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cannot be a non-degenerate interval containing I such that no order is placed
in this interval. The next lemma further ensures that there can be at most
countable number of such I.
Lemma 2.2.7. Let X1 be the set of I that satises the conditions in Lemma 2.2.6.
Then X1 is countable.
To see how Lemmas 2.2.6{2.2.7 lead to Theorem 2.2.1, dene It;1 to be
the largest I such that qt;1(I   ) > 0 for arbitrarily small positive . Note
from Lemma 2.2.5 that It;1 is nite. Thus, q

t;1(I) = 0 for any I  It;1. Then I
described in Lemma 2.2.6, if it exists, must be lower than It;1. Therefore, for
I < It;1, we must have q

t;1(I) > 0 almost everywhere|leading to the result
for supplier 1 in Theorem 2.2.1. The result for supplier 2 can be obtained
similarly.
Remark 2.2.1. Theorem 2.2.1 can be extended to n-supplier settings. All
one needs to do is to repeat the argument in the proof of Lemma 2.2.6 with
qt;i = q

t;i(I) for i = f2;    ; ng.
In our model, we have assumed that the manager makes the pricing
decision before observing the yield realization. This ts the situation when
the manager does not have the exibility of real-time price adjustment based
on current sales. Such a situation may arise, for example, when the price
change requires a certain approval procedure within the rm that takes time
or when the sales process is not instantaneously visible to the manager. If,
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however, the manager is free to quickly adjust the price based on the demand,
there can be two variations of our model, as stated in the remarks below.
Remark 2.2.2. If the price decision is made before observing the yields and
after observing the demand noise, then the optimal price decision is decreasing
in the inventory level and the optimal order decisions follow a near reorder-
point policy. See Lemma A.0.2 in the Appendix.
Remark 2.2.3. If both the price and ordering decisions are made after ob-
serving yields, then the optimal policy is a base stock list price policy [29].
The policy described in Theorem 2.2.1 can be complex and reveal non-
monotone behavior with respect to the inventory level. Before ending this
section, we characterize sucient conditions under which the optimal policy
has simple structural properties.
Theorem 2.2.2. (Conditions for Simple Policy Structure)
i) If the demand "d + ! has a continuous distribution for each d 2 [d; d],
then the optimal order quantities follow a strict reorder-point policy, i.e.,
qt;i(I) > 0 for I < I

t;i and q

t;i(I) = 0 for I  It;i, i = 1; 2.
ii) If the demand has only an additive noise, i.e., " = 1, the following results
hold.
a. When the inventory level increases, the optimal average demand in-
creases but the increase is smaller than the change in the inventory
level. That is, for a small enough  > 0, 0  dt (I + )  dt (I)  .
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b. If the yields are of the all-or-nothing type, i.e., ui 2 f0; uig, i = 1; 2,
then the optimal order quantity qt;i(I) is decreasing in I, i = 1; 2.
Moreover, i) and ii-a) can be extended to general multiple-supplier settings,
while ii-b) holds only for the two-supplier case.
Part i) suggests that when the demand has a continuous distribution,
the policy characterized in Theorem 2.2.1 becomes a strict reorder-point policy.
In this case, the reorder point It;i clearly divides the space of the inventory
level I into an ordering region I < It;i and a nonordering region I  It;i. This
represents a generalization of the results obtained by Anupindi and Akella [5]
and Federgruen and Yang [30], who prove the optimality of strict reorder-point
policies for the special case when price is exogenous.
With only an additive noise in demand, Li and Zheng [48] show that
the optimal price is decreasing in the inventory level when there is only one
supplier. Part ii-a) extends this observation to the case of multiple suppliers.
Moreover, if the suppliers' yields are of the all-or-nothing type, the optimal
order quantities are decreasing in the inventory level as indicated by part ii-b).
This result generalizes a similar one in [5] for the model with exogenous price.
2.3 Two Special Cases and Exact Examples
In this section, we revisit two special cases of our model that have
been analyzed in the literature and demonstrate how earlier results might
not hold when the demand distribution is discrete or the demand noise is
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multiplicative. The rst special case discussed in x2.3.1 involves two suppliers
with random yields and exogenous price. The second special case treated in
x2.3.2 assumes one supplier with random yield and endogenously determined
price. In each case, we present an exact example for the near reorder-point
policy characterized in the previous section.
2.3.1 A Model with Two Suppliers and Exogenous Price
In this case, the price is exogenously given and thus d = d = d.
Anupindi and Akella [5] and Federgruen and Yang [30] analyze a version of
this problem with continuous demand distribution and derive a strict reorder-
point policy (recall Theorem 2.2.2(i)). Our analysis, however, suggests that
such a policy is suboptimal in general when allowing for discrete demand dis-
tributions. Example 1 below shows that the optimal policy is exactly a near
reorder-point policy:
Example 1: c1 = 5, c2 = 6 , H(x) = 0:5maxfx; 0g+ 15maxf x; 0g, d = 10,
Prfu1 = 0g = Prfu1 = 1g = 0:5, Prfu2 = 0:2g = Prfu2 = 1g = 0:5,
Prf" = 0:5g = Prf" = 1:5g = 0:5 and ! = 0. The solution of this problem
with T = 1 is given by
I q1(I) q

2(I)
( 1; 15
2
) 4  4
5
I 5  I
[ 15
2
; 5
2
) 5
2
  I 25
2
[5
2
; 5)  10 + 4I 25  5I
[5; 15) 15  I 0
[15;1) 0 0
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Figure 2.1: The optimal ordering decisions for Example 1.
The optimal policy for Example 1, depicted in Figure 2.1, is the near
reorder-point policy characterized in Theorem 2.2.1. Example 1 also suggests
that the monotone property derived in Theorem 2.2.2 ii-b) (with the all-or-
nothing type yield) does not extend to the case when one suppliers' minimum
yield is positive. In this example, the optimal order quantity from supplier 1
is zero when I = 5=2, while it is strictly positive around the neighborhood of
5=2. When the inventory level is relatively low, i.e., I 2 [ 15=2; 5=2), supply
uncertainties induce a high risk of stockout. In this case, the optimal policy
tends to order more from supplier 2, who is more reliable but more expensive
than supplier 1. As the inventory level increases within this range, the order
quantity from supplier 2 is xed at 25=2, while that from supplier 1 reduces
linearly. In contrast, when the inventory level is relatively high, i.e., I 2
(5=2; 5), it is undesired to place a single large order from one supplier because
now the concern is mainly on overstock. As the inventory level increases within
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this range, the order quantity from supplier 2 decreases dramatically. Instead,
the optimal policy tends to allocate more quantity to supplier 1 to leverage its
lower ordering cost.
In general, the optimal order quantities from both suppliers may in-
crease or decrease with the inventory level. It is, however, impossible that
both order quantities increase at the same inventory level, as stated in the
next theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1. When d = d = d, the optimal order quantities cannot be
strictly increasing in the inventory level at the same time. That is, for any
Ia < Ib, qt;i(I
a) < qt;i(I
b) implies qt;j(I
a) > qt;j(I
b) for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j.
2.3.2 A Model with One Supplier and Endogenous Price
Li and Zheng [48] discuss the case with one supplier and endogenous
price which corresponds to u2 = 0. They derive a strict reorder-point policy
under the assumption that the demand uncertainty is additive. They present
a counter example to demonstrate that the optimal policy in the case with the
multiplicative demand uncertainty is complex. In their example, it is optimal
to order nothing over a strictly positive interval and order a strictly positive
quantity for some inventory level above that interval. We know from Theo-
rem 2.2.1 that a solution with a strictly positive no-order interval below the
reorder point is suboptimal and the optimal policy should be a near reorder-
point policy. In fact, a strictly threshold policy is optimal in their example as
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we show in Appendix. 4
The optimal policy for the case with the multiplicative demand uncer-
tainty can be illustrated using Example 2 below. This example suggests the
optimal policy in general is neither a complex one without any structure nor
a strict reorder-point policy:
Example 2: T = 1, c1 = 12:8, H(x) = 0:5maxfx; 0g + 25maxf x; 0g,
p(d) = 20  0:5d, Prfu1 = 0:1g = Prfu1 = 0:4g = 0:5, u2 = 0, Prf" = 0:5g =
Prf" = 1:5g = 0:5 and ! = 0. The solution of this problem with T = 1 is
given by
I q1(I) d
(I) E[I + uq1(I)  "d(I)]
( 1; 0)  5
2
I 0 3
8
I
[0; 1
12
) 20I 6I 0
[ 1
12
; 1
4
) 5
2
  10I 1
2
1
8
  2
3
I
[1
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; 3
4
) 0 2I  I
[3
4
; 9
4
) 0 3
2
 3
2
+ I
[9
4
; 60) 0 2
3
I 1
3
I
[60;1) 0 40  40 + I
In general, both the optimal order quantity and price may not be mono-
tone with respect to the inventory level. However, at least one of them is
decreasing as the inventory level increases, as stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.3.2. When u2 = 0, the optimal order quantity q

1(I) and the
optimal price cannot be strictly increasing in the inventory level at the same
4We replicate their example and nd such a complex structure goes away when the
computational accuracy is high enough.
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Figure 2.2: The optimal ordering and pricing decisions for Example 2.
time. That is, for any Ia < Ib, qt;1(I
a) < qt;1(I
b) implies dt (I
a) < dt (I
b) and
dt (I
a) > dt (I
b) implies qt;1(I
a) > qt;1(I
b).
2.4 Eect of Correlation on the Optimal Policy
The complex policy behavior in our model is due to the direct inter-
actions between the decisions and the various source of uncertainties via the
terms u1q1, u2q2, and "d in the state dynamics (2.2). As pointed out in Theo-
rem 2.2.2 and Remarks 2.2.2-2.2.3, the optimal decisions may become mono-
tone with respect to the inventory level when some of such interactions are
removed from the model. Our analysis so far has assumed that the random
terms involved are independent. Intuitively, the source of uncertainties can
be reduced when some of the random terms become perfectly correlated. The
question is: will the optimal policy reveal monotone property when some of
the random terms fu1; u2; "g become perfectly correlated? The answer, as
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we demonstrate below, depends on the sign of correlation| it is true under
negative correlation but not under positive correlation. In x2.4.1, we study
correlated yields with two suppliers and exogenously determined price. We
also analyze the case when the yield of one supplier and the demand noise are
correlated in x2.4.2.
2.4.1 Two Perfectly Correlated Suppliers and Exogenous Price
The yields from two dierent suppliers can correlated for various rea-
sons. For example, the suppliers might procure components from a single
source [54]. One such famous case was a small re at a microchip plant owned
by Philips in 2000. The plant supplied chips to both Ericsson and Nokia.
Both Ericsson and Nokia had low yield due to the accident. When suppli-
ers are in one region, their yields can be positively correlated. All Taiwanese
LCD suppliers are exposed to the same natural disaster and the same political
instability. If, however, the two sources of supplies are both internal manu-
facturing facilities, the rm may have limited engineering expertise or quality
investment budget to allocate between these facilities [46]. In this case, the
yields can be negatively correlated. To model these situations, we assume the
yield of supplier 1 has a linear relation with the yield of supplier 2:
u1 = au2 + b; (2.6)
where a and b are constants.
Theorem 2.4.1 characterizes the monotone properties of the optimal
decisions which are also summarized in Table 2.1.
22
Theorem 2.4.1. (Perfect Correlated Supply Yields) When d = d = d,
the following results hold.
i) When b  0, qt;1(I) is decreasing in I.
ii) When ab  0, qt;2(I) is decreasing in I.
iii) Suppose c1  c2. For b = 0 and a > 0, there exists an optimal solution
in which qt;1(I) is decreasing in I and q

t;2(I) = 0. For b =  au2 and
a < 0, there exists qt;2 such that q

t;1(I) is deceasing in I and q

t;2(I) =
maxfqt;2   Iu2+u2 ; 0g.
We interpret Theorem 2.4.1 with the help of Table 2.1, in which we clas-
sify the policy according to the stochastic relation between the yields and their
correlation. The conditions inside the parentheses give rise to the correspond-
ing sign of correlation and stochastic relation between the yields. We observe
from the second row of Table 2.1 that both order quantities are decreasing
in the inventory level when the yields are perfectly negatively correlated. (In
this case, the orders to the suppliers might be complementary and thus reduce
the supply risks.) If, however, the yields are positively correlated, the order to
the supplier with the stochastically larger yield is decreasing in the inventory
level, while the other order may increase or decrease with the inventory level.
Thus, the more reliable supplier is used to hedge with inventory and the less
reliable to miligate the increase in variance of ordering more from the other
supplier.
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Table 2.1: Interpretation of Theorem 2.4.1.
u1 st u2 u1 st u2
Positive corr. (0 < a < 1,  u
2
< b < 0) (a > 1, b  0)
a > 0 qt;1(I) "#, qt;2(I) # qt;1(I) #, qt;2(I) "#
Negative corr.
a < 0 qt;1(I) #, qt;2(I) # qt;1(I) #, qt;2(I) #
2.4.2 One Supplier and Endogenous Price with Perfect Correlation
In practice, the yield and demand can be correlated for various reasons.
For example, the yield rate is decided by the technique and the equipment [6].
When a supplier realizes that the incoming demand is high, he might prefer
to adopt a more reliable (high-tech) production line. In this case, the yield
and the demand uncertainty are positively correlated. However, if the supplier
is a small company, then a booming market might make the small company
experience shortage of raw materials. In this case, the yield is negatively
correlated with demand. To address the eect of the correlation, we focus on a
single supplier (u2 = 0) and assume that the price is endogenously determined.
We assume that the yield rate u1 and the multiplicative demand uncertainty
" are correlated as follows:
u1 = a"+ b (2.7)
for some constants a and b.
Theorem 2.4.2 characterizes the monotone properties of the optimal
decisions which are also summarized in Table 2.2.
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Theorem 2.4.2. (Perfectly Correlated Yield and Demand) When u2 =
0, the following results hold.
i) dt (I) is increasing in I when ab  0. In particular, if b = 0 (then we
must have a  0), dt (I) = argmaxd2[d;d]fR(d)+ (c1=a)dg is constant for
I  It;1 and dt (I) is increasing in I for I > It;1.
ii) qt;1(I) is decreasing in I when b  0.
Table 2.2: Interpretation of Theorem 2.4.2.
u1
u1
st " u1
u1
st "
Positive corr. (0 < a < u1,  "u1 < b < 0) (a > u1, b  0)
a > 0 qt;1(I) "#, pt (I) # qt;1(I) #, pt (I) "#
Negative corr.
a < 0 qt;1(I) #, pt (I) # qt;1(I) #, pt (I) #
We interpret Theorem 2.4.2 with the help of Table 2.2, in which we
classify the policy according to the stochastic relation between the yield and
the demand and their correlation. The conditions inside the parentheses give
rise to the corresponding sign of correlation and stochastic relation between
the yield and the demand. We observe from the second row of Table 2.2 that
both the order quantity and the optimal price are decreasing in the inventory
level when u1 and " are perfectly negatively correlated. This is similar to the
previous example in which the two risks aect one another. If, however, u1 and
" are positively correlated, either price or the order quantity response might
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not be monotone. Specically, when the price has a stochastic larger noise,
the price is still decreasing in the inventory level, while the order quantity may
increase or decrease with the inventory level.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In the chapter, the price is decided before observing yield and demand.
Our results can be extended to the case of pricing after observing demand and
the case of placing the orders after observing the yield. Combining these, we
summarize all cases in which there is a simple structure to the optimal policy
in Table 2.3. For example, we can see that a strictly reorder-point policy
is obtained when the demand has a continuous distribution. However, if the
demand has a discrete distribution, the optimal order quantity in general is
a near reorder-point policy. We can also see that both the order quantity
and price are monotone in the case of a single supplier and additive demand
uncertainty. However, the optimal order quantity follows a near reorder-point
policy when the demand has multiplicative uncertainty or when there are
multiple suppliers.
There are several dimensions along which our work could be extended.
The chapter focuses on the nite horizon. The characterization of the optimal
policy for the innite horizon case would be interesting. In the chapter, we
assume that suppliers do not carry inventory and are not strategic on their
decisions. A possible extension is to consider suppliers' behavior under com-
petition.
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Table 2.3: Summary
 Observing one supplier's yield before ordering, or
Monotone Order Quantity  a single supplier and additive demand uncertainty, or
 two all-or-nothing suppliers and additive demand uncertainty
 Observing yields of two suppliers before pricing, or
 deterministic yields, or
Monotone Price  additive demand uncertainty, or
 multiplicative demand uncertainty and deterministic yield
 Continuous demand distribution, or
Reorder-point policy  a single supplier and additive demand uncertainty
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Chapter 3
Inventory-based dynamic pricing with costly
price adjustment
3.1 Introduction
Rapid advances in technology have created many new opportunities for
rms to change price and replenish inventory frequently. Firms realize that
pricing and inventory decisions are interdependent in inuencing the dynamics
of demand and supply. A low price in the case of overstock typically allows
for faster inventory turnover and reduced holding costs, and a high price in
the case of stockout often alleviates the pressure of backlogging. Coordinating
pricing and inventory decisions has become a major strategy for many rms
[28][17]. In the meanwhile, price revision may be associated with signicant
cost (e.g. LevyBergen and DuttaVenable (1997) [47], Aguirregabiria(1999) [4],
Chen and Hu(2012) [20]) that cannot be overlooked in evaluating the benet
of implementing an inventory-based pricing strategy. Moreover, rms must
understand the eect of price revision cost on the design of combined inventory
and pricing policy.
In this paper we study how a rm's ability to change prices frequently
and eciently may create additional revenue opportunities. We model a
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continuous-review stochastic control problem to make the pricing and inven-
tory decisions. The customer arrives according to a Poisson process with a
price-dependent arrival rate. A replenishment order is associated with a xed
ordering cost and a variable ordering cost. During each inventory replenish-
ment cycle, the rm decides the amount of stock to order as well as how to
adjust the price as customer demand arrives. Every time the price is revised,
the rm pays a xed adjustment cost. The goal is to nd a combined pricing
and ordering policy that yields a high protability.
In our model, if the inverse demand arrive rate is linear or convex in the
average interarrival time over a certain range, then the optimal price must be at
one of the two ends of this range. This result suggests that we can replace any
inverse demand rate function by its concave envelope. The resulting problem
has the same optimal solution as the original problem. In other words, our
formulation is general enough to allow for any price-demand relations, which
represents a generalization of related studies in the literature. Moreover, our
analysis holds for any monotone inventory holding cost functions, which need
not be concave or convex.
We show that the optimal prices are always higher than the myopic
price which maximizes the instantaneous gross (of any xed costs) prot rate.
Within an order cycle, the optimal price increases and the time-average gross
prot rate increases as the inventory level drops. In general, the optimal order-
up-to level increases when the variable ordering cost increases, the inventory
holding cost increase and the demand increases. Interestingly, the optimal
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order-up-to level may not be monotone in the xed ordering cost. This is
due to the presence of a xed price adjustment cost, which requires a careful
coordination between price adjustment and inventory replenishment. We show
that the scale economy in ordering is reected in the replenishment cycle|A
larger xed ordering cost induces a longer average order cycle length.
When price adjustment is not costly, the optimal prot rate can be
represented by the dierence of the marginal price and inventory holding cost
within each price segment, i.e., the range of stock level within which a single
price is charged. In this case, the optimal pricing and ordering decisions can
be computed easily. With costly price adjustment, however, the problem can
be computationally challenging, because the prot function is not unimodal
in the order quantity. We drive bounds on the optimal order quantity, which
allows for narrowing down the search of the optimal solution. To allow for fur-
ther computational tractability for problems with strong economies of scale in
ordering, we consider a relaxation of the model in which we allow the inventory
level to take continuous values. Under this relaxation, we uncover an inter-
esting trade o between the xed costs and the inventory holding cost that
is analogous to the classical EOQ model. In particular, when the inventory
holding cost is linear (convex, concave) in the stock level, the total of xed
ordering cost and price adjustment cost is equal to (greater than, less than)
the total inventory holding cost within a replenishment cycle. We further show
that by properly accounting the inventory holding cost, the optimal solution
yields a same time-average prot for all price segments. This observation al-
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lows us to identify an ecient way to compute the optimal solution for the
relaxed problem.
Through a numerical study, we demonstrate that the inventory-based
price adjustment can yield signicant prot improvement compared to the
optimal static pricing policy. This is particularly the case when the xed
ordering cost is high, the variable ordering cost is high, the inventory holding
cost is high, the demand is high, and the price adjustment cost is low. We also
nd that limited price adjustment can yield a benet that is close to unlimited
price adjustment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews
related literatures. We lay out the model in x3.3 and analyze the optimal
policy in x3.4. In x3.5, we discussed a relaxed problem of our model. Section
3.6 concludes the study.
3.2 Literature Review
In practice, varying prices is often a natural mechanism for revenue
management [38]. In most retail and industrial trade settings, rms use various
forms of dynamic pricing such as promotion [7], auction [58], end-of-season sale
[33], clearance price [55], personalized service [53], and price negotiations [43]
to respond to market uctuations and uncertainty in demand. Most of the
studies in this area focus on understanding the rm's optimal selling strategy
and do not consider inventory replenishment.
31
In many production and supply-chain management contexts, inventory
can be replenished at a cost. In such cases, both pricing and inventory deci-
sions need to be made. Pricing decisions are used to control demand, while
replenishment decisions are used to control supply. The central problem is to
optimally coordinate these demand and supply decisions. The study on com-
bined pricing and inventory decisions dates back to Whitin(1955)[59], with
further development along various dimensions including seasonal demand [39],
xed ordering cost [21][22], unreliable supply [51] [48] [32] and risk aversion [3]
[24]. Excellent surveys are provided by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak(2003)[28],
Yano and Gilbert(2003)[60], and ChenSimchi-Levi(2012) [23].
In a study similar to ours, Rajan, Rakesh and Steinberg(1992) [52]
consider the relationship between pricing and ordering decisions for a monop-
olistic seller rm facing deterministic demand. Their paper provides guidance
in determining when price changes during the cycle are worthwhile due to
product aging, how often such changes should be made and how such changes
aect ordering frequency and quantities. We consider uncertain demand ar-
rival process and costly price adjustment. Consequently, the price revision in
our model is based on the dierent inventory level, which is closer to practice.
Chen, Wu and Yao(2010) [19] study a similar model in which the demand
process is a price dependent Brownian motion. They consider three forms of
demand-price relation, namely, linear, exponential and power functions. They
also assume that the inventory holding cost is linear in the stock level. In
contrast their study, our model allows for a general monotone price-demand
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function and a general monotone inventory holding cost function. Moreover,
the consideration of costly price adjustment makes our problem much more
challenging.
There are several papers model costly price adjustment in dynamic
pricing. Celik, Muharremoglu and Savin(2009) [16] analyze the problem of
selling a xed stock of product over a nite horizon. They demonstrate the
complexity of the optimal policy in the presence of price adjustment cost.
Aguirregabiria(1999) [4] considers a periodic inventory replenishment system
in which price adjustment is associated with a xed cost. They demonstrate
a cyclical price behavior in the optimal policy. Chen and Hu(2012) [20] ex-
tend this study by allowing dierent costs for markup and markdown. Under
the assumption that the demand is deterministic, they design a polynomial
time algorithms to maximize the total prot. Chen, Zhou and Chen(2011)
[25] consider a more complex price adjustment cost which consists of a xed
component and a variable component. They derive solutions for two special
cases of the problem, one without xed price adjustment cost and one without
inventory carryover. For the general model, they demonstrate the complexity
of the optimal policy and propose a heuristic solution. Unlike the aforemen-
tioned studies, which assumes a linear price-demand relation, our model allows
for any monotone demand function that need not be concave or convex.
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3.3 The Model
The rm faces an innite-horizon planning problem. The goal is to
maximize the long-run average prot by appropriately adjusting the inventory
level and the product price over time.
Customer demand arrives according to a Poisson process, whose rate
(p) depends on the price p currently chosen by the manager. We assume that
the set of feasible prices P is bounded with p = minP and p = maxP. Also,
(p) > 0 for p 2 P and (p) strictly decreasing. Then the expected interarrival
time of the demand, (p) = 1=(p) is strictly increasing in p, and its inverse
p() is increasing over T = f : p() 2 Pg. We also dene  = (p) and
 = (p). Therefore, charging a price p() is equivalent to setting an expected
interarrival time  . Whenever he adjusts the price, the manager incurs a xed
cost A  0.
The manager can pay a xed cost K and a variable cost c to replenish
inventory with a negligible delivery leadtime. The manager also incurs an
inventory cost rate of h(i) per unit time when the inventory level is i. We
assume that h(i) is strictly increasing in i with h(0) = 0 and h(i) > 0 for
i > 0. Demand backlogging is not allowed.
In theory, the manager may adjust the price p at any time but at a cost
A. However, because the demand process is Poisson, it is straightforward to
see that we only need to restrict to policies that change price and inventory at a
demand arrival epoch. Now consider the situation where a demand arrival just
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occurs and the current inventory level becomes i. Suppose that the average
time until the next arrival is i. Then the expected gross prot during i can
be computed as
(i; i) = p(i)  h(i)i   c: (3.1)
We shall assume that (1; ) > 0 to rule out the trivial case where it is never
optimal to order and sell any positive quantity. We further note that because
holding inventory is costly (i.e., h > 0) and backlogging is not allowed, the
manager should always replenish whenever the inventory level drops to zero.
Then the manager's problem is to choose an order-up-to level S and a set
of expected interarrival times ~  f1;    ; Sg that maximizes his long-run
average prot expressed as
V (S; ~) =
PS
i=1 (i; i)  A
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g  KPS
i=1 i
; (3.2)
where 1X is the indicator function for event X. Note that in computing the
above prot function, we have assumed a stationary policy (S; ~) and applied
the renewal reward theorem. For our subsequent analysis, we use (S; ~ ) to
denote the optimal decisions and V  to denote the optimal average prot. We
also dene ~^(S) to be the vector of optimal expected interarrival times and
V^ (S) = V (S; ~^(S))
to be the corresponding average prot when the order-up-to level is xed at
S. In the case when multiple optimal solutions exist, we always choose the
one with the smallest S.
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3.4 Analysis of the Optimal Policy
In this section, we analyze the properties of the prot function and
derive the optimal policy. In xx3.4.1, we characterize the optimal solution
under several special cases, which allows us to rule out these cases in our
analysis of the general model. In xx3.4.2, we specify the properties of the
optimal policy and demonstrate the complexity of solving the problem. In
xx3.4.3, we analyze how the optimal policy responds to the changes of the
model parameters to obtain insights into the policy behaviors.
3.4.1 Preliminaries
In our model, we do not impose any condition on the price-demand rela-
tion. Our rst result stated below suggests that it is without loss of generality
to restrict to a concave p().
Lemma 3.4.1. Suppose
p( b)  
c    b
 c   ap(
a) +
 b   a
 c   ap(
c)
for some feasible a;  b;  c 2 T with a <  b <  c, then ^i(S) 6=  b for any
1  i  S and any S.
To understand Lemma 3.4.1, we rst consider the case where the fea-
sible set of expected interarrival times is a compact interval, i.e., T = [ ;  ]. If
p() is convex or linear over some interval [a;  c]  [ ;  ], then Lemma 3.4.1
states that the optimal i(S) cannot be an interior point of this interval. With
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this result, we can replace p() by its concave envelope p() dened by the
following procedure. For each interval [a;  c] over which p() is convex, dene
a pair f 1;  2g with  1  a <  c   2 such that(
 1 = minfA : p()  2 
2 Ap(
A) +  
1
2 Ap(
2) for any A     2g;
 2 = maxfC : p()  C 
C 1p(
1) +  
1
C 1p(
C) for any  1    Cg:
We replace the segment of p() over [ 1;  2] by a linear segment dened as
p() = 
2 
2 1p(
1) +  
1
2 1p(
2) and keep p() = p() otherwise. Then it is
easy to see that p() is concave. Moreover, based on Lemma 3.4.1, the optimal
solution for the problem with the inverse demand p() coincides with that for
our original problem.
Now consider the case where the feasible set of the expected interarrival
times is discrete, i.e., T = f 1;  2;    g. Then one can perform the test with all
a;  b;  c 2 T and exclude the points  b satisfying the condition in Lemma 3.4.1.
This leads to a new feasible set over which p() is concave.
The next lemma further provides a lower bound on the optimal ex-
pected interarrival time that can be easily computed.
Lemma 3.4.2.  i  M = argmax2Tf[p()   c]=g1 for all 1  i  S.
Moreover, if p() is concave, [p()  c]= is unimodal in  .
We note from (3.1) that M also maximizes (i; )= = [p() c]= ih.
In other words, M is the myopic optimal expected interarrival time when we
1We always choose the smallest maximizer if multiple ones exist.
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ignore the xed cost of ordering K and the xed cost of price adjustment
A. Lemma 3.4.2 indicates that the presence of xed costs induces a longer
expected interarrival time, or alternatively a higher product price. We remark
that M is determined myopically because it does not take into account its
impact on the future inventory level and inventory cost.
Lemma 3.4.3. If A  K, then  i =  1 for all 1  i  S.
Lemma 3.4.3 suggest that price adjustment is never optimal if the as-
sociated xed cost is higher than that of ordering. Based on Lemmas 3.4.1,
3.4.2, and 3.4.3, it is without loss of generality that we assume a concave p(),
 = M , and A < K in our subsequent analysis.
3.4.2 Structure of the Optimal Solutions
Within each order cycle, the inventory level drops from the order-up-to
level S to zero as the demand arrives. Intuitively, the manager should charge
a higher price at a lower inventory level. This is formally established in the
next lemma.
Proposition 3.4.1. The following results hold:
i) ^i(S) is weakly decreasing in i for any S > 1.
ii) [p( i )  c]= i is weakly decreasing in i.
iii) (S + 1;  S)=

S  V  < (S;  S)= S.
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Proposition 3.4.1(i) states that the expected interarrival time and thus
the price is weakly increasing as the inventory level decreases. This is because
at the beginning of the order cycle, the inventory holding cost is high due to the
high inventory level. Speeding up the demand arrival by charging a low price
helps to reduce inventory. Toward the end of the order cycle, the inventory level
and thus the inventory holding cost becomes low. Slowing down the demand
arrival by posting a high price allows the manager to improve his prot. Such
a policy leads to an increased time-average prot at each replenishment cycle,
as Proposition 3.4.1(ii) further suggests. In particular, the time-average prot
from selling the rst unit, i.e., (S;  S)=

S , is lower than that of selling the
subsequent units. This is mainly because a lower price is charged at a higher
inventory level. Moreover, the time-average prot of selling any item should
be no lower than the optimal prot rate V  because of the xed costs involved
in the latter.
Proposition 3.4.2. The function V (S) satises the following:8<:
V^ (S) < !M(S + 1) if S < S;
!MA(S + 1)  V^ (S) < !M(S) if S = S;
V^ (S)  !MA(S) if S > S;
(3.3)
where !M(i) = (i;
M )
M
, !MA(i) = (i;
MA) A
MA
, and MA = argmax2T
p() c A

.
By denition, !M(i) is the gross prot rate (excluding all xed costs)
of selling the ith unit, and !MA(i) adjusts !M(i) by including a xed price
adjustment cost for each unit. Clearly, !M(i)  !MA(i) and both can be
computed easily. When it is not costly to adjust price, i.e, A = 0, !M(i) =
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Notes. K = 10, c = 0:2, h(i) = 0:074h2, A = 2:15,  2 f0:4; 0:8; 1:2g, p(0:4) =
5, p(0:8) = 8 and p(1:2) = 10. The optimal solution is S = 8 and (1 ;    ; 7 ) =
(0:8; 0:8; 0:8; 0:4; 0:4; 0:4; 0:4; 0:4).
Figure 3.1: The long-run prot function as characterized in Proposition 3.4.2
!MA(i). In this case, Proposition 3.4.2 suggests a simple way to search for the
optimal order-up-to level.
When A > 0, the long-run prot function V^ (S) is not unimodal in S,
as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. Proposition 3.4.2 suggests how to narrow down
the range to search for an optimal S over the curve V^ (S). The rst relation
in (3.3) implies S  8 and the last relation in (3.3) suggests S  4. The
optimal order-up-to level is S = 8 and the optimal policy calls for changing
the price after selling 3 units during an replenishment cycle.
Lemma 3.4.4. The function V^ (S) satises the following conditions.
i) If S  S, then V^ (S)  V^ (S1) >  ! for all S1 < S,
ii) If S > S, then V^ (S)  V^ (S2) >  ! for all S < S2,
where !  !M(i)  !MA(i) is independent of i.
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In general, Lemma 3.4.4 further suggests the direction to search for the
optimal order-up-to level. If we nd S1 < S satisfying V^ (S)  V^ (S1) >  !,
then the optimal order-up-to level is bigger than S. If we nd S2 > S satisfying
V^ (S)   V^ (S2) >  !, then the optimal order-up to level is less than S. We
note that when there is not cost for price adjustment, i.e., A = 0, we have
! = 0 and thus Lemma 3.4.4 implies that V^ (S) is unimodal.
Lemma 3.4.5. S 2 [S; S), where
S  inf

n : M
nX
i=1
[h(n)  h(i)]  K

;
S  sup

n :
nX
i=1
[A+ h(n)  h(i)] < K

:
Lemma 3.4.5 species the upper and the lower bounds of the optimal
order-up-to level S. Note that when the inventory holding cost is linear, i.e.,
h(i) = hi, then
S =
s
2K
h(2   ) + [
2A  h
2h(2   ) ]
2 +
2A  h
2h(2   )

;
S =
r
2K
Mh
+
1
4
+
1
2

:
The bounds S and S increases when the set-up cost K increases and decreases
when h increases. Also, S decreases when the adjustment cost A increases, and
S decreases when the myopic optimal expected interarrival time M increases.
3.4.3 Comparative Statics
In the section, we analyze how the optimal policy depend on the model
parameters.
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Proposition 3.4.3 (The Optimal Order-up-to Level). Consider two otherwise
identical systems with
i) variable ordering costs ca > cb,
ii) inventory holding costs ha(i)  hb(i) satisfying ha(i) hb(i) being weakly
increasing in i,
iii) xed ordering costs Ka < Kb and A = 0, or
iv) inverse demand functions pi() = ~p(i; ), i = 1; 2, being submodular in
(i; ) and increasing in i, and a < b.
Then Sa  Sb.
According to Proposition 3.4.3, a lower unit ordering cost, a higher
inventory cost,2 or a lower demand rate leads to a higher order-up-to level,
which conrms with one's intuition. One may also expect that a higher xed
ordering cost would also induce a higher order-up-to level. Although this
is true when there is no xed cost of price adjustment, it is generally not
the case otherwise. The left panel of Figure 3.2 provides a counterexample.
We observe that with a positive price adjusting cost, it may become optimal
to order less as the xed cost becomes larger. With less units of items to
2Note that the condition that ha(i)   hb(i) is weakly increasing is realistic and not
restrictive. It simply says that the incremental cost of having one additional unit of inventory
in system a should be no lower than that in system b. This is what one would expect if
holding inventory is more costly in system a than in system b.
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sell in a cycle, the optimal policy can potentially reduce the number of price
changes and thus save on the price adjusting cost. This implies an interesting
coordination problem between ordering and pricing strategies. As a result of
such coordination, the optimal order-up-to level is not monotone with respect
to the xed ordering cost as well as the price adjustment cost, as demonstrated
in Figure 3.2.
Notes. c = 0:55, h(i) = 0:3i, K = 2:5, A = 0:2,  2 [0:4; 4], p() = ln(8:3),
 2 f0:4; 2:2:; 4g.
Figure 3.2: The optimal order-up-to level as a function of model parameters
Proposition 3.4.4 (The Average Cycle Time). Consider two otherwise iden-
tical systems with xed ordering costs Ka > Kb. Then
PSa
i=1 
a PSbi=1  b.
Proposition 3.4.4 suggests that as a result of the coordination between
price and order, the average cycle length reduces as the xed ordering cost de-
creases. Compared with Proposition 3.4.3, the economies of scale in ordering
is reected in time rather than in quantity. Figure 3.3 demonstrate that the
average cycle length is generally not monotone with respect to the price ad-
justment cost or the variable ordering cost, even though the order-up-to level
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is.
Notes. c = 0:6, h(i) = 0:05i2, K = 3, A = 0,  2 f0:4; 0:8; 1:2g, p(0:4) = 1:8, p(0:8) = 2:5 and
p(1:2) = 3:0.
Figure 3.3: The optimal average cycle length as a function of model parameters
Proposition 3.4.5 (The Average Selling Speed). Consider two otherwise
identical systems with variable ordering costs ca > cb. Then
PSa
i=1 

i =S
a PSb
i=1 

i =S
b.
Notes. c = 0:7, h(i) = 0:07i2, K = 1:5, A = 0,  2 f0:3; 0:8; 1:6g, p(0:3) = 1:4, p(0:8) = 2:2 and
p(1:6) = 3:1.
Figure 3.4: The optimal average time to sell a unit as a function of model
parameters
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Proposition 3.4.6 (The Frequency of Price Adjustment). Consider two oth-
erwise identical systems with xed price adjustment costs Aa > Ab. Then,PSa 1
i=1 1fai 6=ai+1gPSa
i=1 
a
i

PSb 1
i=1 1fbi 6=bi+1gPSb
i=1 
b
i
:
Proposition 3.4.6 states that the frequency of changing price decreases
as the adjustment cost increases.
3.5 Continuous Relaxation
As we have shown in xx3.4.2, the prot function V^ (S) may have a
complex structure. In the presence of price adjustment cost, i.e., A > 0,
V^ (S) is not unimodal. This imposes a challenge in solving the problem for
systems exhibiting strong economies of scale in ordering (i.e., requiring a high
order-up-to level). In this section, we consider a relaxation of the problem
by allowing the inventory level to be continuous. When p() is dierentiable,
one can evaluate the derivative of the prot function using this relaxation.
In xx3.5.1, we rst show that when price adjustment is not costly, one can
easily obtain the exact optimal solution when p() is dierentiable. In xx3.5.2,
we introduce the concept of price segment and reformulate the problem with
continuous relaxation. In xx3.5.3, we analyze the structural properties of the
relaxed problem.
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3.5.1 The Special Case without Price Adjustment Cost
Proposition 3.5.1. If A = 0 and price function p() is dierentiable, then
V^ (S) = p0(^i(S))  h(i); 8i: (3.4)
From Proposition 3.5.1, we also can compute the optimal solution for
dierent price functions as shown in Table 3.1. This proposition also reveals
that the value function at a given inventory level can be regarded as a rate
of prot. We shall see that the optimal solution has the property that the
optimal prot rate is maintained constant if the inventory cost is accounted
for properly!
The result in Proposition 3.5.1 allows for easy computation of the opti-
mal solution. In Table 3.1 we provide solutions for three examples of commonly
used demand functions when the inventory cost is linear, i.e., h(i) = hi. The
detailed derivation of the solutions can be found in the appendix. We shall
note that this table provides a simple guideline for changing prices when the
cost of changing them is extremely small.
3.5.2 Denition of Price Segment
To treat the general model with A  0, we introduce the notion of
price segment. From Proposition 3.4.1, the price changes from high to low as
the inventory level goes down. Denote N =
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g as the number of
price adjustment in one replenishment cycle. For each feasible solution (S; ~),
we can dene two vectors ~x = fx0; x1;    ; xN+1g and ~ = f0; 1;    ; N+1g as
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Table 3.1: Examples of the optimal solution for the case without adjustment
cost
Demand Function ( ~S; ~V ) is the solution of S  i
Linear
p
Sh+ V = ( c)
2
p

p() =   

S(  c) K = 4
p

3h
[( ( c)
2
p

)3   (h+ V )3=2] [ ~S]
q

ih+~V
Exponential 1 + ln(Sh+ V ) = ln()  c

p() =  ln() S[ ln()  c] K    [ ~S]
q

ih+~V
( > e) = 
h
[(Sh+ V ) ln(Sh+ V )  (h+ V ) ln(h+ V )]
Isoelastic (Sh+ V )

1  = 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
c
p() =  (Sc+K)
h(1  
1  )

1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
[ ~S] 1 
q

ih+~V
( < 1, 0 <  < 1) = (Sh+ V )
1 2
1    (h+ V ) 1 21 
follows.
x0 = 0; xN+1 = S;
xj = minfljxl+1 6= xl ; k = xl 1+1; xl 1  k  xlg; 1  j  N;
j = xj ; 1  j  N + 1:
When the inventory level falls in (xj 1; xj], items will be sold at the price p(j).
We call the interval (xj 1; xj] the jth price segment. At each replenishment
cycle, the inventory level changes from the (N + 1)st price segment, to the
Nth price segment,    , until the rst price segment as the inventory level
decreases. Denote H(xj 1; xj) as the average inventory holding cost per unit
time when inventory level is in the interval (xj 1; xj]. That is,
H(xj 1; xj) =
Pxj
i=xj 1+1 h(i)
xj   xj 1 :
Then, we can rewrite the long-run average prot V (S; ^) as
V (S; ^) = V [(N;~; ~x) =
PN+1
j=1

(xj   xj 1)

p(j)  jH(xj 1; xj)
  cxN+1  K  NAPN+1
j=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
:
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For our subsequent analysis, we use (N;~; ~x) to denote the optimal decisions
that yields the optimal prot V  to denote the optimal average prot. We
also dene (~^(N); ~^x(N)) to be the optimal decision when the number of price
adjustment is equal to N .
Proposition 3.5.2. If the price function p() is dierentiable, then
V  = p0(j) H(xj 1; xj); for all 0  j  N + 1:
Proposition 3.5.2 shows that the long-run average prot equals the
dierence between the marginal price and average inventory holding cost over
a price segment. In other words, the average prot rate for each price segment
remains constant. This result is a generalization of Proposition 3.5.1. Note
that when A = 0, it is optimal to adjust price whenever the inventory level
changes. In this case, a price segment is dened as (i 1; i] for each 1  i  S.
The simple equation stated in Proposition 3.5.2 can be used to verify whether
a pricing strategy is a candidate for being optimal.
3.5.3 Continuous Approximation
The problem as described above is very hard to solve when N is large.
In this section, we explore the property of the approximate problem in which
we assume that inventory level changes as a continuous variable and obtain a
feasible solution by using a continuous approximation to the inventory level.
Specically, the average prot can be approximated as follows
W (N;~; ~x) =
PN+1
j=1

p(j)(xj   xj 1)  j
R xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
  cxN+1  K  NAPN+1
j=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
(3.5)
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Note that in the above expression we have replaced the summation by the
integration in computing the inventory holding cost. In other words, this
approximation assumes that the demand arrives continuously at a price de-
pendent rate.
For our subsequent analysis, we use (N;~; ~x) to denote the optimal
decisions for the approximated problem andW  to denote the optimal average
prot. We also dene (~^(N); ~^x(N)) to be the optimal solution and W^ (N) to
be the corresponding average prot when the number of price adjustment is
N .
Proposition 3.5.3. The equation h(z)[z   y]   R z
y
h(x) = A
M
; z 2 (y;+1),
has a unique solution z(y), where M = argmaxf[p()  c]=g.
(i) If W^ (N) + h(z(x^N+1(N))) < [p(
M)  c]=M then W^ (N) < W^ (N + 1).
(ii) If W^ (N + 1) + h(z(x^N+1(N + 1))) > [p(
M)   c]=M then W^ (N) 
W^ (N + 1).
Proposition 3.5.3 strengthens the results in Proposition 3.4.2 and Lemma 3.4.4
with the continuous relaxation of the problem. In the original model with a
discrete inventory level, one searches for the optimal policy by changing the
inventory one unit at a time. In the continuous relaxation, this is done by
including or excluding a price segment.
Proposition 3.5.4. Suppose that p() is dierentiable. If h() is strictly con-
cave (linear, strictly convex), then
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K +NA < (=; >)
N+1X
j=1

^j(N)
Z x^j(N)
x^j 1(N)
h(x)dx

: (3.6)
In the classical EOQ model, the fundamental trade o is to keep a
balance between the xed ordering cost and the inventory holding cost. As
a result of this trade o, the optimal economical order quantity should lead
to the set-up cost equal to the inventory holding cost within each order cy-
cle. Proposition 3.5.4 suggest that a similar trade o in our model when the
inventory holding cost is linear. The key dierence in our model is the consid-
eration of price adjustment. Therefore, in the left-hand side of (3.6), we shall
also account for the price adjustment cost as a part of the xed cost. The
expression of inventory holding cost on the right-hand side is more complex
than in the classical EOQ model. This is due to the fact that the rate of
selling the product changes with the price. In general, the equality between
the xed cost and the inventory holding cost does not hold in our model, when
the inventory holding cost is not linear. According to Proposition 3.5.4, the
xed cost is smaller (larger) than the inventory holding cost in an optimal so-
lution when the inventory holding cost is concave (convex) in the stock level.
Proposition 3.5.5 further discovers the impact of inventory holding cost on the
optimal solution.
Proposition 3.5.5. If the price function p() is dierentiable, then for all
j  N + 1,
W^ (N) = Ej (N; x^j 1(N); x^j(N); ^j(N)) 
HEj (N;
~^(N); ~^x(N))
[x^j(N)  x^j 1(N)]^j(N) ; (3.7)
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where
Ej (N; xj 1; xj; j) =
p(j)  c
j
 
R xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
xj   xj 1
HEj (N;~; ~x) = j

(xj   xj 1)h(xj) 
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx

;
+(xj   xj 1)
N+1X
m=j+1

m

h(xm)  h(xm 1)

:
The segment holding cost HEj accounts the total inventory holding cost
paid for the items sold in the jth price segment, which is computed in a
way analogous to the concept of echelon holding cost. The rst term of HEj
corresponds to the holding cost during the jthe price segment as these items
are sold and the second term calculates the cost of holding these items in
previous price segments. The segment gross prot rate Ej is the time-average
gross prot rate over the jth price segment. Therefore, Proposition 3.5.5
suggests a relation among the optimal prot, the segment gross prot rate and
the time-average segment holding cost. This relation says that the dierence
of the last remains unchanged across dierent price segments and it equals
the optimal prot. This observation provides the following insight to the
seller rm: given the current inventory position, the rm should set the price
based on the segment inventory cost instead of the inventory cost at paid
during the current price segment. Using this idea, we allocate the xed cost to
price segment j proportionately according to the segment holding cost. The
allocation provides a method for solving the continuous approximation in a
nice and understandable way (see the details in the appendix).
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Also notice that the proof of Proposition 3.5.5 only uses the rst-order
condition for optimality with respect to xj. Hence, more can be asserted about
the prot rates as stated below.
Corollary 3.5.1. Given ~, if ~x are determined optimally and the xed costs are
allocated proportional to the segment holding cost, then the prot rate across
the segments are equal.
3.5.4 Numerical Study: The Value of Price Adjustment
In this section, we examine the eect of each parameter in the model
on the value gained from changing prices within ordering cycles. In most retail
practice, the number of dierent prices is usually very limited in view of various
implementation considerations. In the subsequent analysis, we focus on how to
obtain the optimal price segments and optimal selling prices for a given upper
bound N on the number of price adjustment. We use the method developed in
x3.5 to compute the optimal policy for the problem with continuous relaxation
and compare the results with the static pricing model W^ (0), in which a xed
optimal price p^(0) is maintained throughout the replenishment cycle.
In Table 3.2, we analyze the eect of dierent model parameters. We
observe that when it becomes more costly to change price (i.e., when A in-
creases), the number of price points in a cycle reduces. However, the cycle
length CT , the average selling speed   and the average price p may in-
crease or decrease in A. These observations are consistent with our discussion
in xx3.4.3. Compared with the case of static pricing, allowing for changing
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price can lead to more prot improvement when the cost of price adjustment
is lower, as shown in the last column of the table.
Table 3.2: Eect of model parameters on the value of price adjustment
Parameter (N+1;    ; 1) CT   p W  p^(0) W^ (0)
W  W^ (0)
W^ (0)
 100%
A = 0
(1:5; 1:65; 1:81; 2:00; 2:21;
2:45; 2:71; 3:05; 3:44; 3:88; 4:42)
38:47 2:22 8:47 0:8413 8:51 0.7109 18.34%
0:15 (1:50; 1:88; 2:39; 3:11; 4:13) 38:80 2:22 8:47 0:8423 8:51 0:7109 15:76%
0:30 (1:50; 2:62; 3:64) 38:31 2:19 8:41 0:8155 8:51 0:7109 14:70%
0:60 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
1:5 (1:53; 3:12) 37:91 2:14 8:34 0:7726 8:51 0:7109 8:67%
K = 20 (1:55; 3:21) 27:91 1:93 7:97 1:2534 7:81 1:2348 1:51%
30 (1:50; 2:07; 2:97) 31:14 1:98 8:13 1:0874 8:05 1:0409 4:47%
40 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
45 (1:50; 2:39; 4:13) 42:82 2:32 8:58 0:6772 8:74 0:5679 19:26%
c = 0:5 (1:50) 28:28 1:50 7:17 1:62 7:17 1:6162 0:00%
1:0 (1:50; 2:32) 32:25 1:74 7:67 1:32 7:17 1:2829 3:23%
1:5 (1:50; 2:64) 34:41 1:89 7:94 1:0477 7:17 0:9496 10:33%
2:0 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
h = 0:01 (1:50) 109:54 1:50 7:17 2:7144 7:17 2:7144 0:00%
0:05 (1:50; 1:92) 53:04 1:64 7:49 1:8234 7:24 1:8120 0:62%
0:15 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
0:20 (1:50; 2:58; 5:00) 37:68 2:55 8:82 0:4892 9:13 0:3545 37:99%
 = 3:5 (1:53; 2:61; 5:00) 44:83 2:71 7:93 0:3521 8:36 0:2357 49:38%
4:0 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
4:5 (1:50; 2:49) 33:89 1:86 8:89 1:3093 8:80 1:2424 5:38%
5:0 (1:50; 2:17) 31:88 1:72 9:56 1:8541 9:17 1:8130 2:27%
 = 3:0 (1:84; 2:91; 5:00) 46:85 3:10 8:58 0:3608 9:13 0:2658 36:69%
3:5 (1:60; 2:62; 4:71) 43:33 2:62 8:49 0:5755 8:77 0:4799 19:92%
4:0 (1:50; 2:28; 3:69) 38:78 2:20 8:43 0:7999 8:51 0:7109 12:51%
4:5 (1:50; 2:65) 34:55 1:90 8:43 1:0325 8:31 0:9556 8:04%
Basic Setting: p() =  ln() for  2 [1:5; 5],  =  = 4, K = 40, c = 2, A = 0:6,
h(i) = 0:15i, and N = 10. CT  =
PN
i=0[(x

j+1   xj )j ],  =
PN
i=0[(x

j+1 xj )j ]
x
N+1
and
p =
PN
i=0[(x

j+1 xj )p(j )]
x
N+1
.
When the xed ordering cost K, the variable ordering cost c, or the
unit inventory holding cost h becomes higher, inventory based price adjust-
ment yields a larger value. Moreover, the dierence among price points also
becomes larger, as implied in the second column of Table 3.2. Even though the
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response of the optimal policy to these three cost parameters is very similar,
the explanation is very dierent. An increased K implies a strong scale econ-
omy in ordering and an extended cycle length. In this case, it is desirable to
further reduced the price at the beginning of the cycle to speed up the selling
and reduce inventory. When it is close to the end of the cycle, a much higher
price is charged to ensure protability when inventory level is lower. Conse-
quently, price adjustment becomes more useful when K is large. An increased
c is immediately translated to a reduced gross margin, which induces the rm
to increase the price. However, in view of the inventory holding cost, it is
not economical to uniformly reduce the product price over the replenishment
cycle. Instead, the rm should keep the low price at the beginning of the cycle
and only increase the price toward to end to compensate for the increased unit
cost. Therefore, the rm's ability to change price becomes important when c
is high. Intuitively, a larger h may induce the rm to charge a lower price at
the beginning of the cycle to speed up the selling process. However, this is
not always true. From Table 3.2, we observe that the rm would rather make
up the increased holding cost by further increasing the price toward the end
of the cycle.
The prot improvement from changing price decreases as  or  in-
creases. From the second column of Table 3.2, we observe that the dierence
of price points becomes smaller as  or  increases. This is because the speed
of selling the product (i.e., 1=) becomes less sensitive to the price. Interesting
 and  has a dierent eect on the average selling price|The rm can sells
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at a higher average price when  increases or  decreases.
In Table 3.3, we compute the percentage gap between the optimal prot
rate and that under limited number of price adjustments. Recall our discussion
for Proposition 3.4.6. The optimal policy calls for more frequent price change
when the adjustment cost is low. Therefore, it makes sense for us to focus on
the case when A = 0 such that it is optimal to revise the price frequently.
Table 3.3: Eect of Upper bound N for Dierent Adjustment Cost
Parameter W^ (0)
W^ (100)
 100% W^ (1)
W^ (100)
 100% W^ (2)
W^ (100)
 100% W^ (3)
W^ (100)
 100%
A = 0 84:46% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
0:15 86:20% 98:06% 99:83% 100:00%
0:30 87:18% 98:67% 100:00% 100:00%
0:60 88:88% 99:58% 100:00% 100:00%
1:5 92:02% 100:00% 100:00% 100:00%
K = 20 96:49% 99:48% 99:81% 99:90%
30 91:89% 98:47% 99:44% 99:72%
40 84:45% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
45 79:04% 95:12% 98:20% 99:09%
c = 1:0 94:90% 99:35% 99:76% 99:88%
1:5 89:80% 98:41% 99:42% 99:70%
2:0 84:45% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
2:5 78:08% 94:33% 97:63% 98:81%
h = 0:01 100:00% 100:00% 100:00% 100:00%
0:05 98:60% 99:83% 99:92% 99:93%
0:15 84:45% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
0:20 66:14% 92:04% 97:28% 98:78%
 = 3:5 60:20% 90:74% 96:83% 98:58%
4:0 84:45% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
4:5 92:47% 98:78% 99:56% 99:78%
5:0 96:34% 99:53% 99:83% 99:92%
 = 3:0 67:05% 93:21% 97:50% 98:73%
3:5 77:60% 94:21% 97:59% 98:80%
4:0 84:45% 96:56% 98:75% 99:32%
4:5 89:50% 98:34% 99:40% 99:70%
Basic Setting: p() =  ln() for  2 [1:5; 5],  =  = 4, K = 40,
c = 2, A = 0, and h(i) = 0:15i.
As a general observation from Table 3.3, price adjustment is subject
to rapid diminishing returns|The additional value obtained from allowing for
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one more price revision within an ordering cycle decreases rapidly with the
maximum number of price adjustments N . In all instances reported in the
table, almost 99% of the optimal prot can be achieved by allowing when
N = 4. Note that in computing the results in Table 3.3, we have set A = 0
in our basic setting. From the rst part of the table that the number of price
adjustment needed to obtain almost 100% optimal prot rate reduces as the
price adjustment cost increases. In other words, when price adjustment is
costly, even less number of price revisions are needed to achieve a high prot.
This is consistent with most retail practice that a very limited number of price
points are observed for a certain product.
The result in Table 3.3 further suggests that one can nd a close-to-
optimal solution for our problem by testing limited number of price points
using the continuous relaxation of the model. This allows for dramatically
reduction of the problem size.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Many rms now have the exibility to change price, order products or
do both at any time. However, the exibility on pricing poses challenges for
making the optimal pricing and replenishment decisions. Our paper explores
this question and provides general instructions for making these decisions. Our
study shows that the optimal pricing strategy is to charge a low price at the
beginning and change to high price later. We also see the eect of the cost
of changing prices. The total replenishment cycle increases as the setup cost
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increases. The average inter-arrival time increases as the unit cost increases.
To investigate more, we discuss two special cases. One is without ad-
justment cost. We nd the rm prefers changing price at each inventory level.
The optimal solution has the property that the rate of prot is maintained
constant if the inventory cost is accounted for properly. We provide the ex-
pression of the optimal order-up-to level and the optimal long-run average
prot for dierent price functions.
For the general case, we provide the continuous approximation solution.
We show that in the optimal solution the xed cost may be larger or small
than the holding cost within a replenishment cycle, depending on the inventory
holding cost function. We investigate the prot rate at each price segment and
discover that in the optimal solution the dierence between the prot rate of
each price segment and the optimal long-run average prot equals the echelon
inventory cost of each price segment. We proved a formulation which can be
easily solved using standard package.
It would be interesting to see whether changing prices within a cycle
is as eective when there is positive leadtime. Leadtime equals zero in our
paper. As we know, involvement of leadtime would make the problem much
more dicult. It is due to the fact that the long-run average problem can
not directly be reduced to one replenishment cycle any longer. The general
method is to design a heuristic pricing replenishment policy and compare it
with the optimal pricing and replenishment policy. We hope to do so on future
work.
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The restriction on the arrival process creates the benet of simplifying
the problem from changing price anytime to changing price based on the in-
ventory level. If demand does not follow a Poisson Process, we can not make
such simplication. However, if rms change the price based on their current
inventory level, then our results can be extended to any arrival process.
Our results also lend themselves to empirical testing regarding the op-
timality of the pricing and stocking policies. Firms can use data about the
inventory position to calculate echelon inventory cost. Further, they can test
whether their marginal prot of each price segment minus the long-run average
prot equals echelon inventory cost. If not, then rms can get more prot by
adjusting the price at the corresponding price segments.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
Two parts of dissertation discuss how to adjust price in dierent envi-
ronments.
The rst project discusses a periodic review inventory model. The
retailer can replenish inventory and change price at each period. We demon-
strate that the optimal order policy is a near-reorder point policy. On the
other hand, the optimal price may increase as the inventory decreases. We
also summarize optimal policies under dierent supplier uncertainties and de-
mand uncertainties.
The second project discusses the optimal sale strategy during the re-
plenishment cycle. The retailer can adjust price at any time. When demand
follows Poisson distribution, it is equivalent to adjust price at each inventory
level. We nd that under the optimal policy, the retailer prefers to adjust
price at each inventory level when the adjustment cost is zero. However, the
retailer only needs to adjust price at limited times when the adjustment cost
is strictly positive. It is interesting to nd that the optimal prot rate will
improve largely even when the price is only adjusted once.
When a customer was cheated, he may not visit the retailer any longer.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. When t = T , we have VT+1(I) = 0 and
JT (I; q1; q2; d) = R(d)  c1q1   c2q2   EH(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d  !)
is concave. Because concavity is preserved under maximization, VT (I) is con-
cave. Now suppose that Vt+1(I) is concave. It follows immediately that
Jt(I; q1; q2; d) is concave and thus Vt(I) is concave. It then follows that Lt(y)
is concave and thus JBt (I; q1; q2; d) is jointly concave.
Since Lt in (2.4) is concave, Lt(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d) is submodular in
(I; qi) and supermodular in (qi; d) and (I; d), i = 1; 2. Hence, Jt and J
B
t are
submodular in (I; qi) and supermodular in (qi; d) and (I; d).
Lemma A.0.1. Suppose that F (I; q1; q2; d) is jointly concave in (I; q1; q2; d).
Let
 =
(
(I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d)jF (I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d) = max
q10;q20;ddd
F (I; q1; q2; d)
)
;
q1(I) = inf
~q1
n
~q1j(I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d) 2 
o
;
q2(I) = inf
~q2
n
~q2j(I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d) 2 ; ~q1 = q1(I)
o
;
d(I) = inf
~d
n
~dj(I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d) 2 ; ~q1 = q1(I); ~q2 = q2(I)
o
:
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Then q1(I), q

2(I), and d
(I) are continuous in I.
Proof By denition, (q1(I); q

2(I); d
(I)) is a maximizer of F (I; q1; q2; d).
Because F (I; q1; q2; d) is jointly concave in (I; q1; q2; d),  is a convex set [11].
Therefore, q1(I) = min~q1
n
~q1j(I; ~q1; ~q2; ~d) 2 
o
is continuous in I.
Now we note that F (I; q1(I); q2; d) is jointly concave in (I; q2; d). Let
1 =
(
(I; ~q2; ~d)jF (I; q1(I); ~q2; ~d) = max
q20;ddd
F (I; q1; q2; d)
)
:
Then 1 is a convex set and q

2(I) = minf~q2j(I; ~q2; ~d) 2 1g is continuous in
I.
Finally, we have F (I; q1(I); q

2(I); d) being jointly concave in (I; d). Let
2 =
(
~djF (I; q1(I); q2(I); ~d) = max
ddd
F (I; q1; q2; d)
)
:
Then 2 is a convex set and d
(I) = minf ~dj(I; ~d) 2 2g is continuous in I.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. Dene y1 = I + u1q1 and
t(y1; q2; d) = J
B
t (I; (y1   I)=u1; q2; d)  c1I
= R(d)  c1y1   c2q2 + ELt(y1 + u2q2   "d): (A.1)
We observe that the right-hand side does not depend on I and is concave in
(y1; q2; d). Let ~d(y1) and ~q2(y1) denote the maximizer of t for a given y1. It
follows that t(y1; ~q2(y1); ~d(y1)) is concave in y1 and has a maximizer, which
we denote by yBt;1. We also denote q
B
t;2 = ~q
B
2 (y
B
t;1) and
dBt =
~d(yBt;1). Thus,
the optimal ordering decision for supplier 1 follows a base-stock policy, i.e.,
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qBt;1(I) = (y
B
t;1  I)+=u1. Moreover, when I  yBt;1, we must have I + u1qB1 (I) =
yBt;1, which implies q
B
t;2(I) = ~q
B
2 (y
B
t;1) = q
B
t;2 and d
B
t (I) =
~d(yBt;1) =
dBt .
Proof of Lemma 2.2.3. We suppose qt;1(I) > 0 and q
B
t;1(I) = 0.
Then, we must have
JBt (0; q
B
t;2(I); d
B
t (I))
= R(dBt (I))  c2qBt;2(I) + ELt(I + u2qBt;2(I)  "dBt (I))
= Jt(0; q
B
t;2(I); d
B
t (I))
 Jt(qt;1(I); qt;2(I); dt (I))
= R(dt (I))  c1qt;1(I)  c2qt;2(I) + ELt(I + u1qt;1(I) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))
 R(dt (I))  c1qt;1(I)  c2qt;2(I) + ELt(I + u1qt;1(I) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I)):
The rst inequality follows from the facts that for model G, (0; qBt;2(I); d
B
t (I))
is a feasible solution and (qt;1(I); q

t;2(I); d

t (I)) is the optimal solution. The
second inequality follows from the concavity of Lt and Jensen's inequality.
If the inequality is strict, then the above relation suggests that in model B,
(qt;1(I); q

t;2(I); d

t (I)) yields a higher prot than (0; q
B
t;2(I); d
B
t (I)). This con-
tradicts the optimality of (0; qBt;2(I); d
B
t (I)). If equality holds in the above
relation, then qt;1(I) = 0 is also an optimal solution. Therefore, we conclude
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.4. We prove the result for supplier 1 and that
for supplier 2 follows in a similar way. To see i), we note that ~qt;1(I) < 0
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implies, for a small enough ,
0  Jt(I; 0; qt;2(I); dt (I))  Jt(I; =u1; qt;2(I); dt (I))
= Vt(I)  [R(dt (I))  c1( =u1)  c2qt;2(I)
+ELt(I + u1( =u1) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))]
=  c1 + Vt(I)  [R(dt (I))  c2qt;2(I) + ELt(I   u1=u1 + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))]
  c1 + Vt(I)  [R(dt (I))  c2qt;2(I) + ELt(I   u1=u1 + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))
=  c1 + Vt(I)  [R(dt (I))  c2qt;2(I) + ELt(I    + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))]
  c1 + Vt(I)  Vt(I   ):
The second inequality follows from Jensen' inequality. The last inequality
follows from the maximality of Vt(I   ). Hence, we obtain part i).
We show part ii) by contradiction. There does not exists a  > 0
satisfying Vt(I+) Vt(I)

 c1. We must have Vt(I+) Vt(I) < c1 for any   0 and
thus for any  2 [0; qt;1(I)u1)]. It follows, for each realization of u1 = u1 6= 0,
c1u1q

t;1(I) > Vt(I + u1q

t;1(I))  Vt(I)
 Jt(I + u1qt;1(I); 0; qt;2(I); dt (I))  Jt(I; qt;1(I); qt;2(I); dt (I)))
= c1q

t;1(I) + ELt(I + u1q

t;1(I) + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
 ELt(I + u1qt;1(I) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I)): (A.2)
The second inequality follows from the maximality of Vt. Taking expectation
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over u1, we obtain
c1u1q

t;1(I)  c1qt;1(I) + ELt(I + u1qt;1(I) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))
 ELt(I + u1qt;1(I) + u2qt;2(I)  "dt (I))
= c1q

t;1(I) = c1u1q

t;1(I):
Since equality holds in the above relation, we must have equality in (A.2) for
each u1. It follows that Vt(I + )   Vt(I) = c1 for  2 [0; qt;1(I)u1)]. This
leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.5. The result would follow if there exists an IUBt
such that qi;t(I) = 0, i = 1; 2, for any I  IUBt . Note from Lemma 2.2.4(ii) and
the concavity of Vt(I), q

i;t(I) = 0 if
Vt(I+) Vt(I)

 minfc1; c2g = c1 for any  >
0. We show that there exists an IUBt such that
Vt(I+) Vt(I)

 minfc1; c2g = c1
for I  IUBt and any  > 0. This is clearly true for period T +1. Suppose it is
true for period t + 1. Note that H(I+) H(I)

 0 for I  0 and  > 0. Hence,
there exists an IUBt such that
E[Lt(I
UB
t +    "d)  Lt(IUBt   "d)]

 0 + c1  c1:
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This implies
Vt(I
UB
t + )  Vt(IUBt )
= max
q1;q20; ddd
Jt(I
UB
t + ; q1; q2; d)  max
q1;q20; ddd
Jt(I
UB
t ; q1; q2; d)
 max
q1;q20; ddd

Jt(I
UB
t + ; q1; q2; d)  Jt(IUBt ; q1; q2; d)

= max
q1;q20; ddd
E

Lt(I
UB
t +  + u1q1 + u2q2   "d)  Lt(IUBt + u1q1 + u2q2   "d)

 E

Lt(I
UB
t +    "d)  Lt(IUBt   "d)

 c1:
Hence, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.6. We prove the result by contradiction. Sup-
pose that the result is not true. Then by the continuity of q1;t(I) established in
Lemma A.0.1, there exists a   such that qt;1(I   1) = 0 for any 1 2 (0;  ).
Now choose a 1 2 [; ] 2 (0;  ) satisfying  < . Because qt;1(I   1) = 0,
we must have
Vt(I   1) = R(dt (I   1))  c2qt;2(I   1)
+ELt(I   1 + u2qt;2(I   1)  "dt (I   1))
= JBt (I   1; 0; qt;2(I   1); dt (I   1))
 max
q20;ddd
JBt (I   1; 0; q2; d):
Because qt;1(I + ) > 0, we have from Lemma 2.2.3, q
B
t;1(I + ) > 0 and thus
qBt;1(I   1) > 0. Moreover, from Lemma 2.2.2, we must have the base-stock
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level yBt;1 > I, and q
B
t;1(I) = (y
B
t;1   I)=u1 for I  I. Now dene ~JBt (I; q1) =
max
q20;ddd J
B
t (I; q1; q2; d). Then ~J
B
t (I; q1) is jointly concave in (I; q1) and
the smallest maximizer of ~JBt (I   1; q1) is qBt;1(I   1) = (yBt;1   I + 1)=u1 >
1=u1. Therefore,
Vt(I   1)  ~JBt (I   1; 0)  ~JBt (I   1; 1=u1)  
= max
q20;ddd
fR(d)  c11=u1   c2q2 + ELt(I + u2q2   "d)g   
 Vt(I)  c11   ; (A.3)
where  = ~JBt (I; 0)   ~JBt (I; =u1) > 0 as the base-stock level yBt;1 > I. To
see the second equality, we note that  = ~JBt (I   1; 1=u1)  ~JBt (I   1; (1  
)=u1)  ~JBt (I   1; 1=u1)  ~JBt (I   1; 0). Therefore, (A.3) implies
Vt(I)  Vt(I   1) > c11: (A.4)
Let ~qt;1(I) be the smallest unconstrained maximizer of Jt(I; q1; q

t;2(I); d

t (I)).
Because qt;1(I  1) = 0, we must have ~qt;1(I  1)  0. Now if ~qt;1(I  1) < 0,
then from Lemma 2.2.4 and the concavity of Vt(I), we have Vt(I) Vt(I 1) 
c11, which contradicts (A.4). Hence, we obtain ~qt;1(I   1) = 0 for 1 2 [; ].
Now we note that Vt is concave so that there can be at most countable
points at which Vt is not dierentiable [10]. For a dierentiable point I 2
[ I   ; I   ], we have
V 0t (I) =
@
@I
ELt(I + u1q

t;1(I) + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
=
@
@I
ELt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
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is well dened. Because ~qt;1(I) = 0, we derive by the envelope theorem
@Jt(I; q; q

t;2(I); d

t (I))
@q

q=0
=  c1 + @
@I
Eu1Lt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
=  c1 + u1 @
@I
ELt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I)) = 0:
This implies that V 0t (I) = c1=u1 = c1. This contradicts (A.4).
Proof of Lemma 2.2.7. Because Vt(I) is concave, it can have at
most countable number of non-dierentiable points. Let N denote the set of
non-dierentiable points. We show that X1  N . Suppose this is not true.
Then there exist an I with V 0t (I) well-dened over the neighborhood of I such
that I satises the conditions in Lemma 2.2.6. In other words, qt;1(I) = 0
and qt;1(I + ) > 0 for any arbitrarily small . From the proof of Lemma
A.0.1, ~q1;t(I) is continuous. Hence, we must have ~qt;1(I) = q

t;1(I) = 0. By the
envelope theorem, we have
V 0t (I) =
@ELt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
@ I
:
Hence, the right-hand side of the above is well dened. The rst-order condi-
tion of ~qt;1(I) = 0 leads to
 c1 + u1
@ELt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
@ I
= 0:
Now consider the benchmark problem B. The above relation implies that
@JBt (I; q1; q

t;2(I); d

t (I))
@q1

q1=0
=  c1 + u1
@ELt(I + u2q

t;2(I)  "dt (I))
@ I
= 0:
It is also clear that
JBt (I; 0; q

t;2(I); d

t (I)) = max
q20;ddd
JBt (I; 0; q2; d):
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Therefore, qBt;1(I) = 0, q
B
t;2(I) = q

t;2(I) and d
B
t (I) = d

t (I). By Lemma 2.2.2,
we must have qBt;1(I) = 0 for any I  I. Moreover, by Lemma 2.2.3, we deduce
that qt;1(I) = 0 for any I  I. This leads to a contradiction.
Lemma A.0.2. If the pricing decision is made before observing (u1; u2) and
after observing ("; !), then the optimal price is decreasing in the inventory
level and the optimal orders follow a near reorder-point policy.
Proof of Lemma A.0.2. Let ~Vt(I) be the optimal prot function in
period t when the inventory level is I. The optimality equation is given by
~Vt(I) = max
q10;q20
~Wt(I; q1; q2)
~Wt(I; q1; q2) = E";![ max
ddd
~Jt(I; q1; q2; d)]
~Jt(I; q1; q2; d) = R(d)  c1q1   c2q2   Eu1;u2H(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d  !)
+Eu1;u2 ~Vt+1(I + u1q1 + u2q2   "d  !)
Note that ~Jt(I; q1; q2; d) is supermodular in (I; d). Hence, the optimal price
is increasing in I. Finally, the optimal ordering decisions can be derived in a
way similar to that of Theorem 2.2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.2. To see part i), we note that the optimal
prot function Vt(I) is dierentiable in I when "d+! has a continuous distri-
bution. The result follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 2.2.7.
For part ii-a), we rst show that dt (I) is increasing in I. We have
Vt(I) = max
d2[d;d]
fR(d) +Gt(I   d)g; (A.5)
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where
Gt(z) = max
q10;q20
f c1q1   c2q2 + ELt(z + u1q1 + u2q2)g:
Since Lt is concave, it is clear that Gt(z) is concave in z and thus Gt(I   d) is
supermodular. We deduce that R(d) + Gt(I; d) is supermodular, which leads
to the desired result.
Next we prove that the change in dt (I) is less than the corresponding
change in I. We can write (A.5) as
Vt(I) = max
z2[I d;I d]
R(I   z) +Gt(z):
Since R and Gt are concave, R(I   z) + Gt(z) is supermodular in (I; z). It
follows that the maximizer zt (I) = I   dt (I) is increasing in I. Hence, we
obtain the desired result.
To prove part ii-b), let i = Prfui = uig, i = 1; 2, and z = I   d. We
have
Jt(I; q1; q2; I   z) = R(I   z) + (1  1)(1  2)Lt(z) +Gt(z; q1; q2);
where
Gt(z; q1; q2) =  c11u1q1   c22u2q2 + 1(1  2)Lt(z + u1q1)
+(1  1)2Lt(z + u2q2) + 12Lt(z + u1q1 + u2q2):
Note that for xed (I; d), the optimal (q1; q2) maximizes Gt(z; q1; q2) and de-
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pends on (I; d) only via z = I   d. Now dene y1 = z + u1q1. Then,
max
q10;q20
Gt(z; q1; q2)
= max
y1z;q20
Gt(z; (y1   z)=u1; q2)
= max
q20
fc11z   c22u2q2 + (1  1)2Lt(z + u2q2) +Q(z; q2)g;
(A.6)
where
Q(z; q2) = max
y1z
 c11y1 + 1(1  2)Lt(y1) + 12Lt(y1 + u2q2):
Let y1(q2) denote the unconstrained maximizer of Q(y1; q2). Then, for given
(z; q2) the optimal y1 is maxfy1(q2); zg. It is easily seen that Q(y1; q2) is
jointly concave and thus Q(z; q2) is concave. If y1(q2)  z), then Q(z; q2)
submodular in (z; q2) because Lt is concave. If, however, y1(q2) < z, then then
Q(z; q2) is concave in q2 and constant in z. In either case, the function inside
the maximum of (A.6) is submodular in (q2; z) and thus the optimal q2(z) is
decreasing in z. We further recall part i) that the optimal zt (I) = I   dt (I) is
increasing in I. We deduce that q2;t(I) = q2(z

t (I) is decreasing in I. Now note
that q1;t(I) = maxfy1(q2(zt (I)))   z1(I); 0g=u1. Since q1;t = 0 when I  It;1,
we focus on the case I < It;1. Let y2 = z + u2q2. For I < I

t;1,
max
q10;q20
Gt(z; q1; q2) (A.7)
= max
y2z
fc11z   c22(y2   z) + (1  1)2Lt(y2) + ~Q((y2   z)=u2)g
where
~Q(q2) = max
y1
f c11q1 + 1(1  2)Lt(y1) + 12Lt(y1 + u2q2)g:
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Because Lt is concave, ~Q is concave. It follows that the function inside the
maximum of (A.7) is supermodular in (y2; z) and thus the optimal y2(z) is
increasing in z. We further recall part i) that the optimal zt (I) = I   dt (I) is
increasing in I. We deduce that zt (I) + u2q

2;t(I) is increasing in I. Also, we
can rewrite ~Q as follows,
~Q(q2) = max
q1
f c11q1 + 1(1  2)Lt(z + u1q1) + 12Lt(z + u2q2 + u1q1)g:
(A.8)
The function inside the maximum of (A.8) is submodular in (z; q1) and (z +
u2q2; q1). Because both z

t (I)+u2q

2;t(I) and z

t (I) increase in I, q

1;t(I) decrease
in I. We conclude the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. We prove the result using contradiction by
assuming that qt;2(I
a)  qt;2(Ib). We must have
0 < Jt(I
b; qt;1(I
b); qt;2(I
b); dt)  Jt(Ib; qt;1(Ia); qt;2(Ib); dt)
=  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia)) + ELt(Ib + u1qt;1(Ib) + u2qt;2(Ib)  "dt)
 ELt(Ib + u1qt;1(Ia) + u2qt;2(Ib)  "dt)
  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia))
+ELt

Ib + u1q

t;1(I
b) + u2q

t;2(I
b)  "dt  

Ib   Ia + u2
 
qt;2(I
b)  qt;2(Ia)

 ELt

Ib + u1q

t;1(I
a) + u2q

t;2(I
b)  "dt  

Ib   Ia + u2
 
qt;2(I
b)  qt;2(Ia)

=  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia)) + ELt
 
Ia + u1q

t;1(I
b) + u2q

t;2(I
a)  "dt

 ELt
 
Ia + u1q

t;1(I
a) + u2q

t;2(I
a)  "dt

= Jt(I
a; qt;1(I
b); qt;2(I
a); dt)  Jt(Ia; qt;1(Ia); qt;2(Ia); dt)  0:
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The rst inequality follow from the optimality of (qt;1(I
b); qt;2(I
b)) for Jt(I
b; qt;1; qt;2; dt).
The second inequality follows from the concavity of Lt. The third equality
comes from the optimality of (qt;1(I
a); qt;2(I
a)) for Jt(I
a; qt;1; qt;2; dt).
Moreover, in the view of above proof, we can obtain that the results of
i and ii-a hold for multiple suppliers and the result of ii-b only holds for two
suppliers. We conclude the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. Suppose that dt (I
a)  dt (Ib) and qt;1(Ia) <
qt;1(I
b) for Ia < Ib. Then we must have
0 < Jt(I
b; qt;1(I
b); 0; dt (I
b))  Jt(Ib; qt;1(Ia); 0; dt (Ib))
=  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia)) + ELt(Ib + u1qt;1(Ib)  "dt (Ib))
 ELt(Ib + u1qt;1(Ia)  "dt (Ib))
  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia))
+ELt

Ib + u1q

t;1(I
b)  "dt (Ib) 

Ib   Ia + " dt (Ia)  dt (Ib)
 ELt

Ib + u1q

t;1(I
a)  "dt (Ib) 

Ib   Ia + " dt (Ia)  dt (Ib)
=  c1(qt;1(Ib)  qt;1(Ia)) + ELt
 
Ia + u1q

t;1(I
b)  "dt (Ia)

 ELt
 
Ia + u1q

t;1(I
a)  "dt (Ia)

= Jt(I
a; qt;1(I
b); 0; dt (I
a))  Jt(Ia; qt;1(Ia); 0; dt (Ia))  0:
The rst inequality follow from the optimality of (qt;1(I
b); dt (I
b)) for Jt(I
b; qt;1; 0; dt).
The second inequality follows from the concavity of Lt. The third equality
comes from the optimality of (qt;1(I
a); dt (I
a)) for Jt(I
a; qt;1; 0; dt). We reach a
contradiction. We conclude the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. If a = 0, then u1 = b is deterministic.
From Lemma 2.2.2, we know qt;1(I) follows a base-stock policy and is thus
decreasing in I. Now note that for I  yBt;1, qt;2(I) = qBt;2 is constant in I.
For I > yBt;1, we have q

t;1(I) = 0 and Jt(I; 0; q2; d) is submodular in (I; q2) by
Lemma 2.2.1. Hence, qt;2(I) is decreasing in I. In particular, if a = b = 0,
then u1 = 0. In this case, the problem reduces to one with only supplier 2 and
thus qt;2(I) is decreasing in I as pointed out by Henig and Gerchak [41].
Now we examine the case when a 6= 0. To see part i), we rst note that
qt;2(I) = 0 for I  It;2. In this case, qt;1(I) is decreasing in I since Jt(I; q1; 0; d)
is submodular in (I; q1) by Lemma 2.2.1. If I < I

t;2, then q

t;2(I) = ~qt;2(I) where
~qt;2(I) is dened in Lemma 2.2.4. Now dene x  aq1 + q2 (or q2 = x   aq1)
and Jt(I; q1; x) = Jt(I; q1; x   aq1; d). Also let Wt(I; q1) = maxx Jt(I; q1; x)
with ~x(I; q1) denoting the corresponding maximizer. It is easily seen that Jt
is concave and thus Wt is concave. The result would follow provided that
Wt(I; q1) is submodular in (I; q1); i.e. for any I
a  Ib and qa1  qb1;
Wt(I
a; qa1) +Wt(I
b; qb1) Wt(Ia; qb1) +Wt(Ib; qa1): (A.9)
It is clear that (A.9) holds when Ia = Ib. Therefore, we focus on the case
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when Ia < Ib. Dene xa = ~x(Ia; qa1) and x
b = ~x(Ib; qb1). We deduce
Wt(I
a; qa1) +Wt(I
b; qb1)  2R(d)
=  (c1 + ac2)qa1   c2xa + ELt(Ia + bqa1 + u2xa   "d)
 (c1 + ac2)qb1   c2xb + ELt(Ib + bqb1 + u2xb   "d)
=  (c1 + ac2)qb1   c2xa + ELt(Ia   b(qb1   qa1) + bqb1 + u2xa   "d)
 (c1 + ac2)qa1   c2xb + ELt(Ib + b(qb1   qa1) + bqa1 + u2xb   "d)
Wt(Ia   b(qb1   qa1); qb1) +Wt(Ib + b(qb1   qa1); qa1)  2R(d): (A.10)
The inequality follows from the maximality of Wt.
Moreover, by the concavity of Wt(I; q), we obtain
Wt(I
b; qb1) Wt(Ia   b(qb1   qa1); qb1)
Ib   Ia + b(qb1   qa1)
 Wt(I
b; qb1) Wt(Ia; qb1)
Ib   Ia ;(A.11)
Wt(I
b + b(qb1   qa1); qa1) Wt(Ia; qa1)
Ib   Ia + b(qb1   qa1)
 Wt(I
b; qa1) Wt(Ia; qa1)
Ib   Ia :(A.12)
Relations in (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12) imply
Wt(I
b; qb1) Wt(Ia; qb1)
Ib   Ia 
Wt(I
b; qa1) Wt(Ia; qa1)
Ib   Ia ;
which leads to (A.9).
To see part ii), we note that u2 =   1au1  ba . Hence, a similar argument
as that in part i) yields the result.
To see parts iii), we note that u1 = au2 when b = 0. We have
Jt(I; q1; x) = R(d)  c1au2q1   c2u2(x  aq1)
+ELt(I + au2q1 + u2(x  aq1)  "d)
= R(d) + au2(c2   c1)q1   c2x+ ELt(I + u2x  "d):
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The right-hand side is separable in q1 and x. Hence, the optimal x

t (I) maxi-
mizes the last two terms for x  0. Since Lt is concave, it is clear that xt (I)
is decreasing in I. Also qt;1(I) maximize au2(c2   c1)q1 over q1 2 [0; xt (I)=a].
If c2  c1, we must have qt;1(I) = xt (I)=a is decreasing in I, which, in turn,
implies qt;2(I) = x

t (I)   aqt;1(I) = 0. If, however, c2 < c1, then qt;I = 0 and
qt;2(I) = x

t (I) is decreasing in I.
For b =  a(u2 + u2) and a < 0, we have qt;1(I) is decreasing in I from
the part i. From the Theorem 2.2.1, Lemma 2.2.4 and the fact c1  c2, we
know that ~qt;1(I)  0 and ~qt;2(I)  0 when I  It;2. From the continuity of
qt;2(I), we only need to prove that there exists qt;2 and an optimal solution
satisfying that qt;2(I) = qt;2  Iu2+u2 when I  I

t;2. Dene y1 = I a(u2+u2)q1
and
t(y1; x) = Jt(I; q1; x) 

(c2   c1) u2
u2 + u2
+ c1

I
= R(d)  c1(au2   a(u2 + u2))q1
 c2u2(x  aq1) 

(c2   c1) u2
u2 + u2
+ c1

I
+ELt[I + (au2   a(u2 + u2))q1 + u2(x  aq1)  "d]
= R(d)  (c2   c1) u2
u2 + u2
+ c1

(I   a(u2 + u2)q1)  c2u2x
+ELt[I   a(u2 + u2)q1 + u2x  "d]
= R(d)  (c2   c1) u2
u2 + u2
+ c1

y1   c2u2x+ ELt[y1 + u2x  "d]:
We observe that the right-hand side does not depend on I and is concave in
(y1; x). Let (y1; x) to denote the maximizer of t. We must exist an optimal
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solution satisfying I a(u2+u2)q1(I) = y1 and aq1(I)+q2(I) = x when I  It;2.
Dene qt;2 = x +
y1
u2+u2
. Thus, q2(I) = x  aq1(I) = x   I y1u2+u2 = qt;2  
I
u2+u2
.
We conclude the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2. The proof is similar to the one for Theo-
rem 2.4.1. The added complexity here is that we have to consider the decision
dt(I) which is bounded from above.
Example 3 Li and Zheng [48]: T = 1, c1 = 1, H(x) = h(maxfx; 0g)2 +
s(maxf x; 0g)2 with h = 2, s = 9, p(d) = 20   d, Prfu2 = 0g = 1, Prf" =
0g = Prf" = 2g = 0:5 and ! = 0. The yield rate u1 is uniform(0,0.5).
Figure A.1: The example provided in Li and Zheng [48].
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
Lemma B.0.1. If A1=B1 < A2=B2 with B1  0 and B2  0, then the following
results hold:
i) A1=B1 < (A1 + A2)=(B1 +B2) < A2=B2.
ii) If B2 > B1, then (A2   A1)=(B2   B1) > A2=B2 > A1=B1. If B1 > B2,
then (A1   A2)=(B1  B2) < A2=B2.
iii) g(n) = A1+nA2
B1+nB2
is increasing in n.
Proof. The proof for part (i) is straightforward. Part (ii) follows because
g0(n) =
A2(B1 + nB2) B2(A1 + nA2)
(B1 + nB2)2
=
A2B1   A1B2
(B1 + nB2)2
> 0:
Derivations for the solutions presented in Table 3.1.
Linear demand function p() =    

. We have p0() = 
2
. From (3.4), we
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have i =
q

ih+V
. Hence, given S, we have
V =
S(  c) K  pPSi=1(pih+ V + ihpih+V )p

PS
i=1
1p
h+V
S(  c) K =
p

SX
i=1
(
p
ih+ V +
ih+ Vp
ih+ V
)
S(  c) K = 2
p

SX
i=1
p
ih+ V
If S is a large number, we can use an integral to approximate the right-hand
side. That is to say
S(  c) K := 2p R S
1
p
xh+ V dx
S(  c) K := 4
p

3h
[(Sh+ V )3=2   (h+ V )3=2]
Take the derivative of both sides with respect to S, we have
  c = 4
p

3h
[(Sh+ V )1=2(h+
dV
dS
)  (h+ V )1=2dV
dS
]
dV
dS
=
1p
SH + V  pS + V [
(  c)h
2
p

  hpSh+ V ]:
We obtain that dV
dS
> 0, when
p
Sh+ V < ( c)h
2
p

; dV
dS
= 0, when
p
Sh+ V =
( c)h
2
p

; dV
dS
< 0, when
p
Sh+ V > ( c)h
2
p

.
Therefore (S; V ) are a solution of the following equation system
p
Sh+ V = ( c)
2
p

(B.1)
S(  c) K = 4
p

3h
[( ( c)
2
p

)3   (h+ V )3=2] (B.2)
The optimal expected interarrival time can be obtained by  i =
q

ih+V  .
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Exponential demand function p() =  ln(), ( > e). We have p0() = 

:
From (3.4), we have i =
p

ih+V
. Hence, given S, we have
V =
 Sc K + PSi=1[ln( ih+V )  ihih+V ]

PS
i=1
1
ih+V
Sc+K = [
SX
i=1
ln(

ih+ V
)]  [
SX
i=1
ih+ V
ih+ V
)]
S(c+ ) +K = [
SX
i=1
ln(

ih+ V
)]
S[(ln()  1)  c] K = [
SX
i=1
ln(ih+ V )]
If S is a large number, we can use an integral to approximate the right-
hand side. That is to say
S[(ln()  1)  c] K = [R S
i=1
ln(ih+ V )]dx
S[(ln()  1)  c] K = 
h
f(Sh+ V )[ln(Sh+ V )  1]  (h+ V )[ln(h+ V )  1]g
S[(ln()  1)  c] K + (S   1) = 
h
[(Sh+ V ) ln(Sh+ V )  (h+ V ) ln(h+ V )]
S[ ln()  c] K    = 
h
[(Sh+ V ) ln(Sh+ V )  (h+ V ) ln(h+ V )]
Take the derivative of both sides with respect to S, we have
 ln()  c = 
h
[(ln(Sh+ V ) + 1)(h+
dV
dS
)  (ln(h+ V ) + 1)dV
dS
]
dV
ds
1
h
ln(
Sh+ V
h+ V
) = ln()  c

  [ln(Sh+ V ) + 1]
We obtain that dV
dS
> 0, when 1 + ln(Sh + V ) < ln()   c

; dV
dS
= 0, when
1 + ln(Sh+ V ) < ln()  c

; dV
dS
< 0, when 1 + ln(Sh+ V ) > ln()  c

.
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Therefore (S; V ) are a solution of the following equation system
1 + ln(Sh+ V ) = ln()  c

(B.3)
S[ ln()  c] K    = 
h
[(Sh+ V ) ln(Sh+ V )  (h+ V ) ln(h+ V )](B.4)
The optimal expected interarrival time can be obtained by  i =
p

ih+V  .
Isoelastic demand function p() = , ( < 1, 0 <  < 1). We have
p0() = 
()1  . From (3.4), we have i =
1 
q

ih+V
. Hence, given S, we have
V =
 Sc K +PSi=1[( ih+V )=(1 )   ih 1 q ih+V ]PS
i=1
1 
q

ih+V
Sc+K =
SX
i=1
[(

ih+ V
)=(1 )]  ()1=(1 )
SX
i=1
[
ih+ V
1 pih+ V ]
Sc+K =
SX
i=1
[(

ih+ V
)=(1 )]  ()1=(1 )
SX
i=1
[
1
ih+ V
]=(1 )
Sc+K = 
1
1  (

1     11  )
SX
i=1
(ih+ V ) 
1
1 
If S is a large number, we can use an integral to approximate the right-
hand side. That is,
Sc+K = 
1
1  (

1     11  ) R S
i=1
(xh+ V ) 

1  dx
Sc+K = 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
h(1  
1  )
[(Sh+ V )
1 2
1    (h+ V ) 1 21  ]
Take the derivative of both sides with respect to S, we have
c =

1
1  (

1     11  )
h
[(Sh+ V ) 

1  (h+
dV
dS
)  (h+ V )  1  dV
dS
]
dV
dS
1
h
[(h+ V ) 

1    (Sh+ V )  1  ] = 1
(Sh+ V )

1 
  c

1
1  (

1     11  )
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We obtain that dV
dS
> 0, when (Sh + V )

1  < 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
c
; dV
dS
= 0, when
(Sh+V )

1  = 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
c
; dV
dS
< 0, when (Sh+V )

1  > 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
c
.
Therefore (S; V ) are a solution of the following equation system
(Sh+ V )

1  = 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
c
(B.5)
Sc+K = 
1
1  (

1   
1
1  )
h(1  
1  )
[(Sh+ V )
1 2
1    (h+ V ) 1 21  ] (B.6)
The optimal expected interarrival time can be obtained by  i =
1 
q

ih+V  .
Computation of the Optimal Solution for the Continuous Relaxation
Let !j be the ratio of the length of the jth price segment to the length
of the replenishment cycle. To nd the optimal selling price, we can write the
problem as follows.
(MP) max
xj ;!j ;j ;j
W =
N+1X
j=1

!j

p(j)  c
j
 
R xj
xj 1 h(x)dx
xj   xj 1  
j
(xj   xj 1)j

s:t:
N+1X
j=1
j = K +NA;
!j =
(xj   xj 1)jPN+1
m=1[(xm   xm 1)m]
; 8j
xj > xj 1; 8j
Here, j can be represent as a method to allocate the xed cost (K +
NA) to N + 1 price segments.
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We can use BARON to obtain optimal solutions for MP. In all the
examples reported in x3.5.4, the optimal solution of MP can be obtained in
no more than 10 seconds.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. Suppose that the result is not true. Then we must
have ^j(S) = 
b for some j. Let i1 = minfi : ^i =  bg and i2 = maxfi : ^i =
 bg. We can nd ^i = a for 1  i  i1   1 and ^i =  c for i2 + 1  i  S.
Now dene two vectors as follows:
Ai =

a for i1  i  i2
^i(S) otherwise,
and Ci =

 c for i1  i  i2
^i(S) otherwise.
Denote  = 
c b
c a . Then ^i(S) = 
A
i + (1   )Ci and p(^i(S))  p(Ai ) +
(1  )p(Ci ) for i  i  S. We have
(i; ^i(S))  (i; Ai ) + (1  )(i; Ci ):
By the optimality of ^i(S), we have for I = A;C,
V^ (S)  V (S; ~ IS) 
PS
i=1 (i; 
I
i )  A
PS
i=2 1^i(S) 6=^i 1(S)  K   cSPS
i=1 
I
i
:
Note that the second inequality follows because
PS
i=2 1^i(S) 6=^i 1(S) 
PS
i=2 1Ii 6=Ii 1 .
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Moreover, strictly inequality holds for I = A. We derive
V^ (S)  max


PS
i=1 (i; 
A
i )  A
PS
i=2 1^i(S)6=^i 1(S)  K   cS


PS
i=1 
A
i
;
(1  )PSi=1 (i; Ci )  APSi=2 1^i(S)6=^i 1(S)  K   cS
(1  )PSi=1 Ci

>

PS
i=1 (i; 
A
i )  A
PS
i=2 1^i(S)6=^i 1(S)  K   cS


PS
i=1 
A
i + (1  )
PS
i=1 
C
i
+
(1  )PSi=1 (i; Ci )  APSi=2 1^i(S)6=^i 1(S)  K   cS

PS
i=1 
A
i + (1  )
PS
i=1 
C
i
 [
PS
i=1 (i; ^i(S))  A
PS
i=2 1^i(S)6=^i 1(S)  K   cS
PS
i=1 ^i(S)
= V^ (S):
This is impossible and hence we conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2. We prove the result using contradiction. Suppose
that the result is not true. Then j = minfij i < M ; 0  i  Sg is well
dened. Let l = maxfij j+i 1 =  j ; 1  i  S   j + 1g. We consider two
cases.
Case 1: l = S. In this case, we must have j = 1 and thus  i = 

1 < 
M .
We derive
V  =
p( 1 )  c
 1
 
PS
i=1 h(i)
S
  K
 1S
<
p(M)  c
M
 
PS
i=1 h(i)
S
  K
MS
= V (S; M ;    ; M):
The inequality follows from the maximality of M and  1 < 
M . The above
relation contradicts the optimality of V . Hence, this case is not possible.
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Case 2: 1  l < S. Consider any X  f1;    ; Sg. We can partition
X into at most s  S number of sets fx1;    ; xsg such that  i =  k1 , where
k1 = minfxkg for k = 1; 2;    ; s. Then,
P
i2X (i; 

i )P
i2X 

i
=
Ps
k=1

 k1
P
i2xk
(i;k1 )
k1

P
i2X 

i

Ps
k=1

 k1
P
i2xk
(i;M )
M

P
i2X 

i
=
(i; M)
M
:
Now dene I = fi : 1  i  j   1 or j + l  i  Sg and NA =PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g. We derive
V (S;  1 ;    ;  j 1; M ;    ; M ;  j+l+1;    ;  S)
=
P
i2I (i; 

i ) +
P
i=2I (i; 
M)P
i2I 

i + l
M
  AN
A +KP
i2I 

i + l
M
>
P
i2I (i; 

i )=
M +
P
i=2I (i; 

j )=

jP
i2I 

i =
M + l
  AN
A +KP
i2I 

i + l

j
=
P
i2I (i; 

i ) + (
M= j )
P
i=2I (i; 

j )P
i2I 

i + (
M= j )l

j
  AN
A +KP
i2I 

i + l

j

PS
i=1 (i; 

i )PS
i=1 

i
  AN
A +KPS
i=1 

i
= V 
The rst inequality follows from  j < 
M and the second equality is obtained
by applying Lemma B.0.1(iii). The above relation contradicts the optimality
of V .
Finally, the unimodality of [p()  c]= in  can be easily veried for a
concave p(). Hence, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3. We prove the result by contradiction. SupposeNA =PS 1
i=1 1i 6=i+1 > 1. Then we can dene a sequence of indices fl0;    ; lNA+1g
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with 1 = l0 <    < lNA+1 = S + 1 such that  i =  lk 1 for lk 1    lk   1
and 1  k  NA + 1. Dene
j^ = arg max
0jNA
Plj+1 1
i=lj
(i;  lj)  A
(lj+1   lj) lj
:
Then,
V (lj^+1   lj^;  j^ ;    ;  j^ ) =
Plj^+1 lj^
i=1 (i; 

j^
) K
(lj^+1   lj^) j^

Plj^+1 1
i=lj^
(i;  
j^
)  A+ (A K)
(lj^+1   lj^) j^

PNA
k=0
Plk+1 1
i=lk
(i;  lk)  A
PNA
k=0(lk+1   lk) lk
+
A K
(lj^+1   lj^) j^

PNA
k=0
Plk+1 1
i=lk
(i;  lk)  A

+ (A K)PNA
k=0(lk+1   lk) lk
= V :
The rst inequality follows because (i; ) is weakly decreasing in i, the second
inequality from Lemma B.0.1, and the third inequality form A > K. The above
relation contradicts the optimality of V . Hence, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Suppose the result in part (i) is not true. Then
there exists some inventory level j, 1 < j  S, such that ^j(S) > ^j 1(S). Note
that we can always choose j to be the maximum of such inventory levels, i.e.,
j = maxfi : ^i(S) > ^i 1(S)g. Dene l1 = minfi : ^i(S) = ^j 1(S); 1  i 
j   1g and l2 = maxfi : ^i(S) = ^j(S); j  i  Sg. Now we construct another
vector (1;    ; S) as follows:
i =
8<:
^j 1(S) if l1 + l2   j + 1  i  l2;
^j(S) if l1  i  l1 + l2   j;
^i(S) if 1  i < l1 or l2 < i  S:
By construction we have
PS
i=1 ^i(S) =
PS
i=1 i and thus
PS
i=1 p(^i(S)) =PS
i=1 p(i). Because h(i) is strictly increase, we have
PS
i=1 h(i)^i(S) >
PS
i=1 h(i)i.
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Also, by maximality of j, we deduce
PS 1
i=1 1f^i(S)6=^i+1(S)g 
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g.
Therefore,
V (S; ~^(S)) =
PS
i=1(p(^i(S))  h(i)^i(S))  A
PS 1
i=1 1f^i(S)6=^i+1(S)g  K   cSPS
i=1 ^i(S)
<
PS
i=1(p(i)  h(i)i)  A
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g  K   cSPS
i=1 i
= V (S; ~):
It contradicts with the optimality of ~^(S). Thus, we obtain part (i).
Part (ii) follows immediately because M <  1       S and [p() 
c]= is unimodal in  with the maximizer M .
Part (iii) can be obtained by contradiction. If V   S;(S;S )

S
, then
from Lemma B.0.1, we have
V^ (S   1)  V (S   1;  1 ;    ;  S 1) 
A1f^
S 1 6=^(S)gPS 1
i=1 

i
 V 
It contradicts with the optimality of V .
Next we show (S+1;  S)=

S  V . We assume (S+1;  S)= S >
V . From Lemma B.0.1(ii),
V^ (S + 1)  V (S + 1;  1 ;    ;  S ;  S) > V :
It contradicts with the optimality of V . We conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. We rst show V  < !M(S). Suppose V  
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!M(S). We have
V (S   1;  1 ;    ;  S 1) =
PS 1
i=1 (i; 

i ) K   A
PS 2
i=1 1fi 6=i+1gPS 1
i=1 

i

PS 1
i=1 (i; 

i ) K   A
PS 2
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g + (i; 

S)  A1fS 1 6=SgPS 1
i=1 

i + 

S
= V :
The inequality follows from Lemma B.0.1(ii) and the fact that V   !M(S) >
(S;
S ) A1fS 1 6=Sg

S
. The above relation contradicts the fact that S is the
smallest maximizer. Hence, we must have !M(S) > V .
Next we prove !MA(S + 1)  V . Suppose !MA(S + 1) > V . Then,
V (S + 1;  1 ;    ;  S ; MA)

PS
i=1 (i; 

i ) K   A
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g + (S
 + 1; MA)  APS
i=1 

i + 
MA
>
PS
i=1 (i; 

i ) K   A
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1gPS
i=1 

i
= V :
The rst equality follows from 1f
S 6=MAg  1. The second inequality fol-
lows from Lemma B.0.1(i) and the observation that V  < !MA(S + 1) =
(S+1;MA) c A
MA
. The above relation contradicts the optimality of V  and thus
!MA(S + 1)  V .
Now we show that V^ (S)  !MA(S) for S > S.
V^ (S + 1)  V (S + 1;  1 ;    ;  S ; MA)

PS
i=1 (i; 

i ) K   A
PS 1
i=1 1fi 6=i+1g + (S
 + 1; MA)  APS
i=1 

i + 
MA
 (S
 + 1; MA)  A
MA
= !MA(S + 1):
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The rst inequality follows from the optimality of V^ (S + 1). The second
inequality follows from 1f
S 6=MAg  1. The last inequality follows from
Lemma B.0.1(ii) V^ (S)  !MA(S + 1) = (S+1;MA) A
MA
. Note that !MA(i) >
!MA(i + 1). Thus, we can repeat the same argument to show V^ (i)  !MA(i)
for all i  S + 1.
Finally, we note for S < S, V^ (S) < V^ (S) < !M(S)  !M(S + 1).
Hence, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.4. To see part (i), let S\ = maxfijV^ (i) < !MA(i)g.
In view of the proof of Proposition 3.4.2, we have V (S\   1) < V (S\) <
!MA(S\) < !MA(S\   1). By induction, we have for all S1 < S  S\,
V (S1) < V (S)  V (S\) < !MA(S\)  !MA(S) < !MA(S1)
Next we consider the case S1 < S and S
\ < S  S. Using Proposition 3.4.2,
we have !MA(S)  V^ (S) < !M(S) for all S\ < S  S and V^ (S1) < V^ (S) <
!M(S). Hence,
V (S)  V (S1) > !MA(S)  !M(S)
= !MA(S)  !MA(S)  (!M(S)  !MA(S))
 0  ! =  !
The rst inequality comes from !MA(S)  V^ (S) and V^ (S1) < !M(S). The
second inequality comes from that S  S and !MA(:) is a strictly decreasing
function.
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To see the part (ii), from Proposition 3.4.2, we have V^ (S)  !MA(S)
when S > S. Hence, V^ (S) + !  !M(S) > !M(i) for all i > S. Hence,
V^ (S) + !
> max
S+1jS2
fV (S; ^1(S2);    ; ^S(S2));
(j; ^j(S2))  A1^j 1(S2)6=^j(S2)
^j(S2)
g
= max
S+1jS2
PS
i=1 (i; ^i(S2)) K   A
PS 1
i=1 1^i(S2)6=^i+1(S2)PS
i=1 ^i(S2)
;
(j; ^j(S2))  A1^j 1(S2)6=^j(S2)
^j(S2)


PS
i=1 (i; ^i(S2))PS
i=1 ^i(S2) +
PS2
j=S+1 ^j(S2)
 K   A
S 1X
i=1
1^i(S2)6=^i+1(S2)
+
S2X
j=S+1
[(j; ^j(S2))  A1^j 1(S2)6=^j(S2)]

= V^ (S2):
We conclude the proof of the part (ii).
Proof of Lemma 3.4.5. Suppose there is a nite S such that M
P S
i=1[h(
S) 
h(i)]  K,
V ( S; M ;    ; M) =
S(p(M)  c) K  P Si=1 h(i)
SM

S(p(M)  c)  Sh( S)M
SM
= !M( S)
Therefore, V^ ( S)  !M( S). From Proposition 2, we have S < S.
Suppose there is a nite S such that
PS
i=1[A + h(S)   h(i)] < K.
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Combining with A  0 and the optimality of !MA(S), we have
V^ (S) 
PS
i=1[p(^i(S))  c  A]PS
i=1 ^i(S)
  K   SA+
PS
i=1[h(i)^i(S)]PS
i=1 ^i(S)
 !MA(S) + h(S)  K   SA+ [
PS
i=1 h(i)]
S
= !MA(S)  K  
PS
i=1[h(S)   h(i) + A]
S
< !MA(S)
Therefore, V^ (S) < !MA(S). From Proposition 2, we have S  S.
Proof Proposition 3.4.3. By Lemma 3.4.1, we only need to treat the case
when  is over a compact interval. To see part (i), we note that M continues
and weakly increases in c. Therefore, if ca   cb is suciently small, we have
Mb  Ma PSbi=1  bi =Sb+1fb1 =Mbg for any  > 0. We consider two cases:
Case 1: If  b1 = 
Mb, then  bi = 
Mb for all 1  i  Sb by Lemma
3.4.2. Also
V^ a(Sb)  !Ma(Sb + 1)  V a(Sb; Ma;    ; Ma)  !Ma(Sb + 1)
=   K
SMa
 
PSb
i=1 h(i)
Sb
+ h(Sb + 1)
   K
SMb
 
PSb
i=1 h(i)
Sb
+ h(Sb + 1)
= V b(Sb; Mb;    ; Mb)  !Mb(Sb + 1)
= V b   
b(Sb + 1; Mb)
Mb
 0
The rst inequality comes from the optimality of V^ a(Sb), the second from
Ma  Mb, and the third from Proposition 3.4.1. Together with Proposi-
tion 3.4.2 (i), we obtain Sa  Sb.
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Case 2: If  b1 > 
Mb, then
PSb
i=1 
b
i =S
b  maxfMa;  b
Sb
g. Suppose
Sa > Sb. We claim aSa   bSb . To see that, suppose aSa <  bSb . Let la =
maxfi : ai >  aSa ; 1  i  Sag. Because V a  V a(Sa; a1 ;    ; ala ;  bSb ;    ;  b

Sb),
we derive from Lemma B.0.1(ii)
V a 
PSb
i=la+1 
b(i;  b
Sb) + A1fala =b

Sbg
 PSbi=la+1 a(i; aSa)
(Sa   la) b
Sb   (Sa   la)aSa
 p(
b
Sb)  p(aSa)
 b
Sb   aSa
:
Likewise, we can derive V b <
p(b
Sb ) p(
a
Sa )
b
Sb 
a
Sa
. These relations imply V b < V a,
which contradicts the fact that ca > cb. Thus, we must have aSa   bSb .
Now note from Proposition 3.4.1, V b
  b(Sb+1;  b
Sb
 )= b
Sb
 and V a <

~b(S
~b;  aSa)=
a
Sa . Then,
V b   V a > 
b(Sb

+ 1;  b
Sb
 )
 b
Sb
  
a(Sa; aSa)
aSa
=
p( b
Sb
 )  cb
 b
Sb
  p(
a
Sa)  ca
aSa
  h(Sb + 1) + h(Sa)
 p(
b
Sb
 )  cb
 b
Sb
  p(
a
Sa)  ca
aSa
 c
a   cb
maxfMa;  b
Sbg
:
The rst inequality follows from the assumption Sa > Sb. To see the second
inequality, we consider two cases: (a) If  b
Sb
  Ma, then Ma   b
Sb
  a
Sa
 .
It follows that [p( b
Sb
 )   cb]= bsb   (ca   cb)= bsb  [p(aSa )   ca]=asa . (b)
If  b
Sb < 
Ma, then Mb   bSb < Ma. It follows that [p( bSb )   cb]= bsb 
[p(Ma)  ca]=Ma + (ca   cb)=Ma  [p(a
Sa )  ca]=asa + (ca   cb)=Ma.
However,
V b   V ~b < V b   V ~b(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  b

Sb) =
(ca   cb)SbPSb
i=1 
b
i
 c
a   cb
maxfMa;  b
Sbg
;(B.7)
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which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, Sa  Sb and obtain part (i).
To see part (ii), suppose Sa > Sb. We claim aSa   bSb . To see that,
suppose aSa < 
b
Sb . Let l
a = minfi : ai = aSa ; 1  i  Sag. Because
V a  V a(Sa; a1 ;    ; ala ;  bSb ;    ;  bSb), we derive from Lemma B.0.1(ii)
V a 
[
PSb
i=la 
b(i;  b
Sb) + A1ala 1=bSb
] PSai=la a(i; aSa)
(Sa   la + 1) b
Sb   (Sa   la + 1)aSa
 p(
b
Sb)  p(aSa)
 b
Sb   aSa
:
Likewise, we can derive V b <
p(b
Sb ) p(
a
Sa )
b
Sb 
a
Sa
: These relations imply V a > V b,
which contradicts the fact that ha(i)  hb(i) for all i > 0. Thus, we must have
aSa   bSb .
We further note
V b   V a > 
b(Sb + 1;  b
Sb)
 b
Sb
  
a(Sa; aSa)
aSa
=
p( b
Sb)  c
 b
Sb
  p(
a
Sa)  c
aSa
+ ha(Sa)  hb(Sb + 1)
 ha(Sa)  hb(Sb + 1)  ha(Sb + 1)  hb(Sb + 1):
The rst inequality comes from Proposition 3.4.1(iii) and the second from
Lemma 3.4.2 and aSa   bSb  M . However,
V b   V a < V b   V a(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb)
=
PSb
1 [h
a(i)  hb(i)] biPSb
1 
b
i
 ha(Sb + 1)  hb(Sb + 1):
The last two relations contradicts each other. Hence, we conclude part (ii).
To see part (iii), we note that V^ b(S) < V^ a(S) for any S  1 and
V b < V a. Suppose Sb < Sa, then from the proof of part (i), we have
V^ a(Sb) > V^ b(Sb)  !M(Sb + 1)  !M(Sa) > V^ a(Sa)  V^ a(Sb):
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This leads to a contradiction, and thus we must have Sb  Sa.
Finally, we show part (iv). Without loss of generality, suppose ~p() is
continuous in  . First, we will show that M decreases in . For every c > d
and  c >  d, we have
~p(c;  c)
 c
  ~p(
d;  c)
 c
=
~p(c;  c)  ~p(d;  c)
 c
<
~p(c;  d)  ~p(d;  d)
 c
 ~p(
c;  d)  ~p(d;  d)
 d
=
~p(c;  d)
 d
  ~p(
d;  d)
 d
:
The rst inequality comes from the submodularity of ~p(; ), the second in-
equality from  c   d. Hence, ~p(;)

= is submodular in (; ). Thus, (~p(; ) 
c)= is also submodular on (; ). Therefore, M decreases in .
Without loss of generality, we assume b   a > 0 is small enough
satisfying that
Mb  Ma < minf g1b1 >Mb + 1b1 =Mb ;
where   = minf : ~p() c

=
PSb
i=1 [~p(
b
i ) c]PSb
i=1 
b
i
;   Mbg and  > 0. To show that
Sa  Sb, we analyze two cases: Case 1,  b1 = Mb and Case 2,  b1 > Mb.
Case 1:  b1 = 
Mb. From Proposition 3.4.1, we have  bi = 
Mb for all
1  i  Sb. We also have
V^ a(Sb)  !Ma(Sb + 1)
 V a(Sb; Ma;    ; Ma)  !Ma(Sb + 1) =   K
SMa
 
PSb
i=1 h(i)
Sb
+ h(Sb + 1)
   K
SMb
 
PSb
i=1 h(i)
Sb
+ h(Sb + 1) = V b(Sb; Mb;    ; Mb)  !Mb(Sb + 1)
= V b   
b(Sb + 1; Mb)
Mb
 0:
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The rst inequality comes from the optimality of V^ a(Sb). The second in-
equality comes from Ma  Mb. The third inequality comes from Proposition
3.4.1. Combing V^ a(Sb) > !Ma(Sb + 1) with Proposition 3.4.2 (i), we have
that Sa  Sb.
Case 2:  b1 > 
Mb. Suppose Sa > Sb. Let la = minfi : ai =
aSa ; 1  i  Sag. First, we show aSa   bSb . Suppose aSa <  bSb . Because
V a  V a(Sa; a1 ;    ; ala ;  bSb ;    ;  bSb), we derive from Lemma B.0.1(ii)
V a 
PSb
i=la 
a(i;  b
Sb) + A1fala =bSbg
 PSbi=la a(i; aSa)
(Sa   la + 1) b
Sb   (Sa   la + 1)aSa
 ~p(
a;  b
Sb)  ~p(a; aSa)
 b
Sb   aSa
:
Likewise, we can derive V b <
~p(b;b
Sb ) ~p(
b;a
Sa )
b
Sb 
a
Sa
. Because ~p(; ) is sub-
modular, we have ~p(a;  b
Sb)   ~p(a; aSa)  ~p(b;  bSb)   ~p(b; aSa) and thus
V a  V b. This is impossible as pb() > pa(). Therefore, we must have
aSa   bSb .
Also from Proposition 3.4.1, V b  b(Sb + 1;  b
Sb)=
b
Sb and V
a <
a(Sa;  aSa)=
a
Sa  !Ma. We have
V b   V a > 
b(Sb + 1;  b
Sb)
 b
Sb
  
a(Sa; aSa)
aSa
=
~p(b;  b
Sb)  c
 b
Sb
  ~p(
a;  aSa)  c
aSa
  h(Sb + 1) + h(Sa)
 ~p(
b;  b
Sb)  c
 b
Sb
  ~p(
a;  aSa)  c
aSa
 ~p(
b;  b
Sb)  ~p(a;  bSb)
 b
Sb
:
The second inequality follows from the relation h(Sa)  h(Sb + 1) as Sa >
Sb. To see the third inequality, we consider two cases. (a) If  b
Sb  Ma, then
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aSa   bSb  Ma. It follows
~p(a;b
Sb ) c
b
Sb
 ~p(a;aSa ) c
a
Sa
. (b) If  b
Sb < 
Ma, then
Ma >  b
Sb  Mb . By Lemma 3.4.2, we obtain
~p(b;b
Sb ) c
b
Sb
 ~p(b;Ma) c
Ma
.
We further note
V b   V a < V b   V a(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb) =
PSb
i=1[~p(
b;  bi )  ~p(a;  bi )]PSb
i=1 
b
i
 ~p(
b;  b
Sb)  ~p(a;  bSb)
 b
Sb
(B.8)
We reach a contradiction and thus we obtain part (iv).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. From Proposition 3.4.3, we have Sa  Sb.
Suppose
PSb
i=1 
b >
PSa
i=1 
a. Because V b  V b(Sa;  a1 ; ; aSa ), we derive
from Lemma B.0.1(ii).
V b <
PSb
i=1 (i; 
b
i )  A
PSb 1
i=1 1fbi 6=bi+1g  
PSa
i=1 (i; 
a
i )  A
PSa 1
i=1 1fai 6=ai+1g

PSb
i=1 
b
i  
PSa
i=1 
a
i
:
Also, because V a  V (Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb), we derive from Lemma B.0.1(ii).
V a >
PSb
i=1 (i; 
b
i )  A
PSb 1
i=1 1fbi 6=bi+1g  
PSa
i=1 (i; 
a
i )  A
PSa 1
i=1 1fai 6=ai+1g

PSb
i=1 
b
i  
PSa
i=1 
a
i
:
The two relations above imply V a > V b, which leads to a contradiction.
Hence, we must have
PSb
i=1 
b PSai=1 a.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.5. We have
0  V a   V a(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb) + V b   V b(Sa; a1 ;    ; aSa)
= V a   V b(Sa; a1 ;    ; aSa) + V b   V a(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb)
= ca
"
SbPSb
i=1 
b
i
  S
aPSa
i=1 
a
i
#
+ cb
"
SaPSa
i=1 
a
i
  S
bPSb
i=1 
b
i
#
= (ca   cb)
"
SbPSb
i=1 
b
i
  S
aPSa
i=1 
a
i
#
Hence,
PSa
i=1 
a
i
Sa 
PSb
i=1 
b
i
Sb .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.6. The result follows directly from the relation
V a + V b  V a(Sb;  b1 ;    ;  bSb) + V b(Sa; a1 ;    ; aSa):
Since the argument is similar to that of Proposition 3.4.4, we omit the details.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. Dierentiating the objective function (3.2)
with respect to i, (1  i  S), we have
p0(i)  h(i)PS
l=1 l
  V 1PS
l=1 l
= 0;
which leads to V = p0(i)  h(i), 8i.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2. Dierentiating the objective function V [ with
respect to , we obtain
[p0(j) H(xj 1; xj)dx](xj   xj 1)PN+1
l=1 [(xl   xl 1)l]
  (xj   xj 1)VPN+1
l=1 [(xl   xl 1)l]
= 0;
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which lead to V = p0(j) H(xj 1; xj).
Proof of Proposition 3.5.3. Let G(z; y) = h(z)(z   y)  R z
y
h(x)dx. Then,
G01(z; y) = (z y)h0(z)+h(z) h(z) = (z y)h0(z) > 0 and limz!y G(z; y) = 0.
Hence, for a xed y, there exists an unique solution z(y) of G(z; y) = A=M ,
z > y.
Next, we claim
A
M
+
R z
y
h(x)dx
z   y 
A
M
+
R z(y)
y
h(x)dx
z(y)  y ; 8z > y: (B.9)
To see that, we note
@
@z
 A
M
+
R z
y
h(x)dx
z   y

=
(z   y)h(z)  A
M
  R z
y
h(x)dx
(z   y)2 (z   y)
2 =
G(z; y)  A
M
(z   y)2 :
Also, G(z; y)   A=M < 0 when z 2 (y; z(y)) and G(z; y)   A=M > 0 when
z 2 (z(y);+1).
To prove part (i), we denote y1 = x^N+1(N). Then
W^ (N) <
p(M)  c
M
  h(z(y1))
=
p(M)  c
M
 
A
M
+
R y1
z(y1)
h(x)dx
z(y1)  y1
=
[p(M)  c](z(y1)  y1)  M
R z(y1)
y1
h(x)dx  A
[z(y1)  y1]M
Applying Lemma B.0.1, we obtain
W^ (N) < W (N + 1; ^0(N);    ; ^N+1(N); M ; x^1(N);    ; x^N+1(N); z(x^N+1(N)))  W^ (N + 1);
leading to part (i).
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To prove part (ii), we assume that W (N) < W^ (N +1) holds. We have
W^ (N + 1) > W (N; ^1(N + 1);    ; ^N+1(N + 1); x^1(N + 1);    ; x^N+1(N + 1)):
Let y2 = x^N+1(N + 1). Applying Lemma B.0.1, we deduce
W^ (N + 1) <
(x^N+2(N + 1)  y2)

p(^N+2(N + 1))  c]  ^N+2(N + 1)
R x^N+2(N+1)
y2
h(x)dx  A
[x^N+2(N + 1)  y2]^N+2(N + 1)
=
p(^N+2(N + 1))  c
^N+2(N + 1)
 
R x^N+2(N+1)
y2
h(x)dx+ A
^N+2(N+1)
x^N+2(N + 1)  y2
 p(
M)  c
M
 
R x^N+2(N+1)
y2
h(x)dx+ A
^N+2(N+1)
x^N+2(N + 1)  y2
 p(
M)  c
M
 
R z(y2)
y2
h(x)dx+ A
^N+2(N+1)
z(y2)  y2
=
p(M)  c
M
  h(z(y2)):
This leads to a contradiction and thus we obtain part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 3.5.4. Let G(y) =
R y
0
h(x)dx  yh(y)
2
. We have
G0(y) = h(y)  h(y) + yh
0(y)
2
=
h(y)  h(0)  (y   0)h0(y)
2
:
It is easy to see that G0(y) > (=; <)0 when h(x) is strictly concave (linear,
strictly concave).
The rst order condition of xj yields
p(N+1)  N+1h(xN+1)  cPN+1
i=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
  N+1WPN+1
i=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
= 0;
p(j)  p(j+1)  h(xj)(j   j+1)PN+1
i=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
  (j   j+1)WPN+1
i=1 [(xj   xj 1)j]
= 0; 8j  N:
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We deduce
p(N+1)  c
N+1
= h(xN+1) +W; (B.10)
p(j)  p(j+1)
j   j+1 = h(xj) +W; 8j  N: (B.11)
In view of (3.5), we have
W [xN+1N+1 +
NX
i=1
xj(j   j+1)] = W
N+1X
i=1
[(xj   xj 1)j]
= [p(N+1)  c]xN+1 +
NX
i=1
xj[p(j   p(j+1)] 
N+1X
j=1

j
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
  [K +NA]
= [W + h(xN+1)]xN+1N+1 +
NX
i=1

[W + h(xj)]xj(j   j+1)

 
N+1X
j=1

j
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
  [K +NA]:
Simplifying the equation above, we obtain
K +NA 
N+1X
j=1

j
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx

= 2
N+1X
j=1

j

G(xj 1) G(xj)]

: (B.12)
Hence the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.5. The rst-order condition of xj, 1  i  N +1,
yields
p(N+1)  c
N+1
 W = h(xN+1);
p(j)  p(j+1)
j   j+1  W = h(xj); j  N:
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Hence,
p(N+1)  c WN+1 = N+1h(xN+1);
p(j)  p(j+1) W (j   j+1) = (j   j+1)h(xj); j  N:
For all 1  j  N + 1, summing up the rst (N + 2  j) equations leads to
p(j)  c Wj = N+1h(xN+1) +
NX
m=j

(m   m+1)h(xm)

:
Hence
(p(j)  c Wj)(xj   xj 1)  j
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
= j

(xj   xj 1)h(xj) 
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx

+ (xj   xj 1)
NX
m=j+1

m+1(h(xm+1)  h(xm))

:

p(j)  c
j
 
R xj
xj 1
h(x)dx
xj   xj 1  W

(xj   xj 1)j
= j

(xj   xj 1)h(xj) 
Z xj
xj 1
h(x)dx

+ (xj   xj 1)
N+1X
m=j

m(h(xm)  h(xm 1))

:
we conclude the proof.
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